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1. The fourth session of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development is being held at a very special time in international 
economic relations, which makes it all the more necessary to obtain 
some concrete results towards solving the developing countries' 
problems. 
The short period of improvement in the external sector of the 
countries of the third world, to which the boom in the developed 
economies contributed and which was reflected in the rise in the price 
of raw materials in 1973 and the first'part of 197^» has come to an 
end and has been replaced by a period of falling commodity prices, 
difficulties in the sale of commodities, proliferation of 
protectionist measures affecting exports of manufactures, increases 
in import prices due to world inflation, and heavy impact of the 
servicing of external financing on the balance of payments, which has 
been accentuated by the deterioration in external debt conditions. 
At the same time, a drastic change is occurring in the 
international economic and financial system, and some possibilities 
are visualized of passing on from confrontation to negotiation 
between developing and developed countries in order to place 
international economic relations on a more equitable footing. 
Latin America, in particular, is experiencing serious 
difficulties - with the likely prospect that they will continue to 
be aggravated by instability and uncertainty in its external sector -
which are increasingly hampering the normal functioning of the 
economy and the implementation of development policies. In 1975^ 
the balance of payments deficit 'on current account of the non-oil-
exporting countries amounted to about 16,400 million dollars, 
compared with 4,300 million in 1973» The trade balance showed a 
deficit of 11,100 million dollars in 1975 compared with 1,200 million 
in 1973» This rapid increase in the deficit occurred in spite of 
the fact that the growth rate of the gross domestic product of these 
countries was only 2.2 per cent in 1975 compared with 7»3 per cent 
in 1973-
/2. In 
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2. In the field of commodities, international co-operation has 
shown no significant progress since the second session of UNCTAD. 
The renewed impetus given to the international discussion of this 
question by the Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions of the United 
Nations General Assembly led to some partial results in the second 
half of 1975, such as the renegotiation of the international coffee, 
cocoa and tin agreements and the relative improvement in the IMF 
compensatory financing facility. However, the chronic problems of 
international commodity trade persist and are becoming more serious, 
as may be seen from the relevant section of this document which shows 
that real prices of most commodities declined in 1975 to the 
depressed levels recorded during the previous decade.l/ 
Although the Latin American countries have made some progress 
in the diversification of their ejcports, particularly in certain 
sectors of manufactures, it cannot be denied that the major 
proportion of their total foreign exchange receipts continues to 
depend on external demand and the prices of a limited number of 
commodities. The proposals by-the UNCTAD secretariat concerning an 
f k " integrated programme on dfommŝ .t4.es offers the opportunity to tidoptfV' 
decisions that will set in motion a process of negotiations on som6 
fundamental aspects of commodity .trade. 
This document reviews data and presents criteria with the 
purpose of assisting the developing countries, and the Latin American 
countries in particular, to participate constructively in devising 
and formulating policy measures for solving the chronic problems of 
commodity trade. With this end in view, it presents figures showing 
the share of the various developing areas and the developed countries 
in world exports of 32 commodities, and the share of a selected 
group of commodities in the exports and imports of each country in 
1/ A detailed review of the evolution of the prices and volumes of 
""* exports of commodities of export interest to the Latin American 
countries is presented in the document entitled International 
commodity markets in 19.75 (E/CEPA-L/L.134), which is being issued 
simultaneously with this report. 
/the Latin American 
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the Latin American, area«. It- suggests some guiding principles which 
should be taken into consideration in entrusting to an 
intergovernmental group the task of working out detailed proposals 
for the establishment: of;a common fund for the financing of buffer 
stocks. It stresses, the innovations included in the international 
agreements on commodities renegotiated in the course of 1975» 
whereby machinery is established, for the periodical review of current 
prices in order that factors of. a monetary and commercial nature may 
be taken into account in defending prices against inflation. Lastly, 
in summarizing the. changes recently.introduced in the IMF compensatory 
financing facility, it is concluded that on the one-hand such changes 
represent an improvement' in that'they make the machinery for 
determining.shortfalls in.export receipts more flexible and increase 
the total amount of credit upon which the developing countries may 
draw at a given moment, while on the other hand such credit continues 
to be granted mainly on, a short-term or medium-term basis and it does 
not adequately compensate for the shortfalls in export receipts 
measured in real terms, for all of which reasons they could not be 
considered as substitutes for other measures that would be directly 
instrumental in maintaining remunerative and stable prices for 
commodity exports from-developing countries. 
Both the machinery for the periodical review of prices contained 
in the commodity agreements.and the changes" in compensatory financing 
referred to are important factors for a policy designed to protect 
the developing countries from the effects of external inflation 
and other negative effects which are beyond their control. 
3. Latin America's exports of manufactures, although making up 
only a relatively small proportion of the total, are the main 
dynamic element-in the region's exports. The world economic recession 
is affecting them very severely, and it is therefore of great, 
importance to these countries that restrictive trading practices 
should be corrected and that the Generalized System of Preferences 
should be improved, and expanded, 
/The ECLA 
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The ECLA secretariat fully recognizes this, and it is already 
at an advanced stage in the preparation of studies on the policies 
adopted by some countries of the region for the promotion of exports 
of manufactures.and the results obtained through them. It has also 
systematically assembled the available information on the use made.by 
the countries of the region of the tariff.preference schemes put into 
effect by the developed countries.!/ This report includes an 
appraisal of the United States scheme, which came into force in 
January 1976« 
Latin America's external indebtedness, which has grown sharply 
in recent years, reflects the need to seel: partial financing of the 
balance-of-payments deficits of the countries of the region. Faced 
with a severe increase in their current account deficit, these 
countries have applied adjustment policies which have meant big 
sacrifices as regards growth rates and unemployment levels. The fact 
that this situation is common all over the Third World does not make 
it any the less serious for Latin America, particularly as the great 
majority of the countries of the region are being excluded, from the 
traditional sources of long-tei-m ffflji'knfei'n̂ .t; ^ ** « 
Thus, the aggravation of their current account deficits and 
their limited access to long-term financing have obliged the Latin 
American countries to have increasing recourse to the private 
financial market, on which most of their recent new indebtedness has 
been contracted. The duration of the loans taken out on this market 
is very short, so that Latin America's external debt has become less 
favourable in composition as well as growing in amount. Similarly, 
the average cost of the debt is increasingly high as the proportion 
accounted for by official aid diminishes while the interest rates 
collected on the private market above the rates considered as basic 
increase all the time. 
1/ A recently published ECLA cuaderno, HLa Coyuntura Internacional 
y el Sector Externo" (ECLA Cuadernos No. 7, Santiago, Chile 1975) t 
also gives a comparative analysis of the principal preference 




The changes made or about to be made in.the international 
monetary system, although they represent some relief for the problems 
of Latin America and the non-oil-exporting developing countries in 
general, accentuate the problems of the faulty distribution of 
international liquidity, while in some respects they also create new 
commitments for those countries. Not more than 11 per cent of the 
new available resources generated by the various modifications in the 
international monetary system and in the operations of the 
International Monetary Fund will be at the disposal of the developing 
countries, although these account for 22 per cent of the quotas in 
the latter institution. . . : 
The present report contains an analysis of the problems of 
external indebtedness of Latin America and the other developing areas, 
together with a brief appraisal of the possible implications for the 
developing countries of the changes being made in the International 
Monetary Fund and its operations and in the international monetary 
system. i 
5« In view of the difficulties being experienced by the Latin 
American countries, it is more important than ever to strengthen , 
co-operation among developing countries at the levels of the regicin 
and the other Third World countries. At the regional level, progress 
made so far in the formal integration processes, and through modalities 
which supplement them, provide the experience and a basis for 
rapidly expanding such co-operation, mainly in the areas of trade, 
industry, technology, financing, transport and energy. The 
co-operation of Latin America with other developing areas has so far 
been minimal and can be subject to considerable expansion. The action 
guidelines for co-operation among developing countries were established 
in the resolution adopted at the Third Meeting of Ministers of the 
"Group of 77!l held in Manila; the main task is to put these guidelines 
into practice, and in many cases this requires the co-operation of the 
industrialized world. 
/The recent 
The recent establishment of the Latin American Economic System 
(SELA) offers a new mechanism, complementing existing integration and 
co-operation machinery, for promoting and implementing co-operation 
initiatives among developing countries at the regional level. 
This report presents views on some of the subjects to be 
discussed at UNCTAD IV. They have been selected in the light of their 
importance to Latin America, the relative maturity reached at the 
international level in their study, which could lead to the adoption 
of substantive decisions by the Conference, and the fact that some of 
them have recently been responsible for events whose importance should 
be brought out so that Latin America can make an effective contribution 
to the negotiations. 
/I. INTERNATIONAL 
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I. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELD: . . -
" ** OF BASIC COMMODITIES " '' ' " 
In the mid-term review and appraisal of progress in the 
implementation of the international Development Strategy, 
particularly as regards international trade policy measures, the 
General Assembly concluded that "little progress has been made on 
international action in the field of commodity trade".1/ . 
This opinion, biased on a detailed review of developments 
in the field of international commodity trade during the first 
half of the present decade, sums up the feeling of frustration 
of the great majority of the developing countries and the meaning 
of their efforts to promote substantive changes in the system of 
international economic relations. 
The Programme of Action included in the Manila Declaration 
states, in the section on commodities, that the present situation 
of commodities contains a number of new factors which could form 
the basis for a fresh initiative that would contribute to the 
establishment of a new international economic order, including the 
setting up of new production and market structures for commodities. 
During the three stages into which the eighth session of the Committe 
on Commodities was divided in the course of 1975» the various elements 
of the Integrated Programme were intensively discussed and the 
conclusion was finally reached that the task of preparing studies 
could be considered to have been completed and the next phase 
would be that of policy decisions and negotiations. This is one 
of the fields in which it is hoped that substantive decisions will 
be adopted at the fourth session of UNCTAD, as regards both the 
various elements of the programme and the time-table for the 
negotiations. 
1/ General Assembly resolution 5517 (XXX), section III. 
/Objectives of 
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Objectives of international action in the commodity field 
Even though it may appear redundant to repeat here the 
objectives laid down in the Manila Programme of Action for 
international action in the field of commodities, it is useful 
to summarize them in order to analyse them in terms of the policy 
measures and institutional arrangements proposed for achieving 
them. These objectives, in the terms approved by the developing 
countries, are: 
"(a) Improvement of the terms of trade of the developing 
countries in the field of commodities; 
(b) Supporting commodity prices at levels which in real 
terms are remunerative and just to producers and equitable to 
consumers, taking full account of the rate of world inflation and 
fluctuations in the exchange rates of the main currencies; 
(c) Reduction of excessive fluctuations in commodity prices 
and supplies in the interests of both producers and consumers; 
(d) Improving and stabilizing in real terms the purchasing 
power of the export earnings,of individual developing countries; 
(e) Expansion of developing countries exports of primary and 
processed products, improvement of the competitiveness of natural 
products vis-k-vis synthetic substitutes and harmonization of the 
production of synthetics and substitutes in developed countries with 
the supply of natural products produced in developing countries; 
(f) Diversification of production, including food production, 
and expansion of the processing of primary commodities in developing 
countries with a view to promoting their industrialization and 
increasing their export earnings; 
(g) Assurance of access to markets of developed countries 
for exports from developing countries; 
(h) Increasing the participation of developing countries in 
the transport, marketing and distribution of their exports and their 
share in the earnings therefrom»"1/ 
1/ Manila Declaration and Programme of Action, (TD/195)i 
12 February 1976= 
/To analyse 
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To ¿rialyse these objectives in the abstract would be of no 
interest since it is not possible, in principlej to disagree with 
them. In order to achieve those objectives, however, it is necessary 
to devise and provide suitable instruments for the policy measures 
which the developing countries consider appropriate. It seems 
desirable, therefore, that the analysis of the Programme of Action 
included in the Manila Declaration should centre on the policy 
measures and institutional arrangements proposed by the developing 
countries as a whole, relating'them to the achievement of the 
aforementioned objectives. ; 
International measures of the programme 1/ 
"(a) Establishment of a common fund for the financing of 
international commodity stocks or other necessary 
measures within the framework of commodity arrangements." 
The establishment of a common fund for the financing of 
commodity buffer stocks was one of the proposals discussed at the 
second session of UNCTAD in 1968 and on which no agreement was 
reached. In the new proposals put forward by the secretariat of 
UNCIAD, the common fund for financing of buffer stocks is 
regarded as the cornerstone of the whole Integrated Programme for 
Commodities. The decision expected on this point is basically a 
policy decision, that is, whether or not a common fund for the 
financing of buffer stocks should exist, since the amount of such 
a fund, the lines along which it should be set up, its operational 
arrangements and the commodities it may finance a m a t t e r s that 
would have to be negotiated by an intergovernmental group specially 
convened for the purpose. In adopting a decision on the establishment 
of this common fund and the procedure for its negotiation, the 
Conference may deem it advisable to recommend to the negotiating 
agency siome important guiding principles for the negotiations, such 
as: ' • ' ""• ' ' ' " ' 
1/ The sub-titlës on the following pages are the international 
measures .of, the,-Manila Declaration and Programme of Action. 
/- direct 
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- direct contributions from governments and criteria for 
establishing the scale of such contributions; 
- participation of international financial institutions and 
procedures for such participation; 
- limitations which may or should be imposed on the common 
fund in obtaining resources on private capital markets or in 
contracting credit lines with commercial banks; 
- whether ttye common fund should act as a central bank or 
financing agency of the group of buffer stocks, without intervening 
in their individual operational arrangements; . 
- whether as financing agency its resources would be available 
only for such buffer stocks as fulfilled certain requirements, and 
whether in addition to acting as financing agency the common fund 
could in certain circumstances (for example, a critical market 
situation for a commodity for which no institutional arrangement 
of any kind exists) intervene directly in the market until such 
time as the appropriate intergovernmental arrangements could be 
made towards the establishment of a buffer stocks. 
- lastly, whether the common fund should be set up as an 
independent institution or whether its functioning and operation 
may be entrusted to one of the existing international financial 
institutions. 
It does not seem relevant here to revive the discussion on 
the advantages or possible disadvantages of a common fund for the, 
financing of buffer stocks. The developing countries have already 
defined their position in favour of this common fund and, therefore, 
what is required is to obtain the co-operation of the developed 
countries which still oppose this proposal in order to establish the 
rules and,procedures for negotiations. Nor does it seem relevant 
in dealing with this point to reopen the discussion regarding the 
nature and mode of operation of the buffer stocks that may be set 
up for specific commodities, since these are questions which should 
be discussed by those negotiating each particular stock. On the 
other hand, it would seem highly desirable that the support given to 
/this initiative 
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this initiative by the developing countries at the Manila session, 
and especially the financial contribution announced by the 
Government of...the Philippines, should be reinforced by similar 
announcements by other„governments- of developed market-economy 
and socialist countries and developing countries which are already 
in a position to make commitments in this respect. 
"(b) Setting up of international commodity stocking 
arrangements." 
Once the decision is taken to establish a common fund for the 
financing of buffer stocks, the next step would be to decide on the 
list or group of commodities on which it was proposed to negotiate 
agreements for the operation of buffer stocks. In preparing this 
list, two different groups of commodities should be considered: 
(i) those mainly exported by developing countries (e.g., tropical-
commodities); and (ii) those which are largely exported by developed 
countries but which aré;also of considerable importance among the' 
exports of certain developing countries (for example, cereals, 
cotton, wool and several metalliferous ores). This list should 
reflect a proper balance of interests among the various developing 
areas or groups of developing countries in order to ensure that all 
or most of them are directly linked with the management of the 
buffer stocks. It is necessary here to reconcile the need for thé 
list to be as representative and comprehensive as possible with the 
need to confine it to the number of co^o^iti©8 for which it is 
expected to obtain the necessary financial resources. 
Table 1 presents a list of 32 important world trade 
commodities, together with the share of the various trading areas 
in the average value of world exports in the years 1970-1972. A 
preliminary, study by the UNCTAD secretariat identified l8 commodities 
(indicated with an asterisk in table 1) of which stocks could feasibly 
be set up, although in preparing the list no comments were made regarding 
the cost of maintaining or the problems of financing such stocks. 
/Table 1 
Table 1 
PERCENTAGE SHARE OP DEVELOPING REGIONS AND THS REST OP THE «RID 
IN MAIN WORLD CCMMODITY EXPORTS . 
(Average for the period 1970-1972). 
Developing regions Rest 
Commodity and SITC code JLatin 




1» Bananas (051.3)a/ 76.5 6.7 ?.8 0.3 93.3 " 6.7 
Coffee (071.1)*" 64.0 28.1 3.9 0.8 96.8 3.2 
Bauxite (283.3)* 62.6 3.0 4.2 m 69.8 30.2 
Pish meal (081.4) 59« 5 3-6 1 . 0 m 64.1 35.9 
- Sugar (061.1/2)* 50.8 5.7 11.9 1.3 69.7 30.3 
H . Cocoa (072.1)* 16.3 80.3 0.4 2.2 99.2 0.8 
Groundnuts (221.1) 5.8 57.2 8.2 0.3 71.5 28.5 
Groundnut oil (421.4) 21.0 56.7 0.5 - 78.2 21.8 
Sisal (265.4)* 4o.l 56.7 0.8 m 97.6 2.4 
III. Jute (284)* 0.5 • 95.1 m 95*6 4.4 
Hetap (265.5) 4.8 - 92.6 m 97.3 2.7 
Rubber ( 2 3 I . I ) * 1.0 7.8 88.6 0.3 97.7 2*3 
Copra (221.2) 0.7 6.6 74.4 17.7 99.4 0.6 
Olive oil (422.2) 0.4. 20.0 7 1 . 8 0.1 92.3 7.7 
Coconut oil (422.3) 0.9 2.5 71.6 8.0 83.0 1 7 . 0 
Tea (074.1)* 2 . 1 13.4 67.1 0.2 82.8 1 7 . 2 
Tin (283.6-687.I)* 16.2 8.3 61.1. 85.5 14.5 
W , Cotton (263.1)* . 17.4 29.4 11.1 - 57.9 42.1 
Unseed oil (422.1) 57.7 - m - 57.7 42.3 
Manganese ore (283.7) 18.4 29.9 7.8 m 56.1 43.9 
Copper (283.17-682.1)* 21.2 27.9 4.5 0.9 54.5 45.5 
V. Iron ore (281)* I8.7 12.1 7.1 : - - 37.9 62.1 
Rioe (042)* 3.3 5.8 26.7 m 35.8 64.2 
Hides and skins (211) 16.7 7.7 ' 6.2 m 30.7 69.3 
Beff (011.1) 29.0 1.4 m 30.5 69.5 
Tobaoco (121) 8.2 7.8 10.8 m . 26.8 73*2 
Wood (241/2/3) 3.1 5.9 15.4 0.2 24.6 75.H 
Maize (044)* 16.6 1.1 5.3 mm 23.I 76.9 
Zino (283.5-656.1)* 15.6 6.4 - m 22.0 78.0 
Lead (283.4-685.1)* 13.1 7.6 0.4 - ' 21.1 78.9 
Wool (262.2)* 9.3 0.2 2.4 - 11.9 88.1 
Wheat (041)* 2.9 0.2 0.6 m 3.6 96.4 
Source: Data obtained from International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Comaodity Trade and 
Price Trends (1975 edition). 
The msnbers in brackets indicate the appropriate group or sub-group of the Standard Internacional Trade 
Classification (SITC). 
* Commodities which can be stooked (see document TD/te/C.1/166), 9 December 1974. 
/It Will 
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It will be noted that in the case of only 9 of these 18 commodities 
(coffee, bauxite, sugar, cocoa, sisal, jute, rubber, tea and tin) 
the major proportion of world exports come from developing countries; 
in that of two other commodities (cotton and copper), the developing 
countries account for a little over 50 per cent of world exports, 
while in that of another seven (iron ore, rice, maize, zinc, lead, 
wool and wheat), the developing countries' share is less than 
one-third of the total. 
At a later stage of its study, the secretariat of UNCTAD 
prepared estimates of the order of magnitude of. the financial 
resources that would be required to set up commodity stocks, 
taking as a basis a smaller list of commodities divided into two 
groups, one requiring immediate financing, and the other requiring 
only government commitments to provide the funds" when riecessary 1/ 
(see table 2). , , 
Some facts should be taken into aiccount in examining this 
table. The list includes tin, a commodity which: is regulated by 
an international agreement envisaging a buffer stock financed by 
the producer countries'(411 developing countries) and voluntary 
contributions from two importing countries. It also includes coffee, 
on which a new international agreement not envisaging the setting 
up of buffer stocks was recently signed. Furthermore, the state 
of the coffee market which was relatively critical up to mid-1975» 
changed radically as a result of serious damage to Brazil's 
production. Therefore, it will probably be unnecessary and perharps 
even impossible to set up coffee stocks in the near future. The list 
also includes copper, the world prices of which dropped sharply in 1975 
on account of the recession in the developed countries, a trend which 
the measures for regulating supply did nothing to counteract. Since 
some developed countries export copper on a considerable scale, 
1/ The secretariat finally proposed the establishment of a common 
fund of 3,000 million dollars, of which 1,000 million would 
be subscribed by the governments and 2,000 million would be 
obtained on the international capital markets. 
/Table 5 
Table 2 
GROUP OP BASIC COIEKffirrlKS FOR THE SETT DIG- UP 
OP BUFFER STOCKS 
Millions of dollars 
Group requiring immediate financing 
(1) Raw ooffee , 1 100 
(2) natural rubber 2 1 0 
(3) Copper 1 100 
(4) Tin 270 
(5) Tea JO 
lotc.1 2 330 
Group requiring finance oor.raitments 
rr CJÇ M» m » I» ••! 4L.:» IE i » T «i-»-« f » » 
(1) Sugar 1 200 
( 2 ) Cotton éOO 
(3) Cocoa beans 330 
(4) Hard fibres 60 
(5) Jute and jute manufactures loO 
1 2^0 
Spur09: An^nte^^^J^r^r^'ffi 
for^X-a, ̂ ŴiẐ -JiSJiS.J&ffiR̂ Jï̂ , i Report by the 
S e or etaî '-G en er al of U1ICTAD (TB/^/c.l/lG4). 
/they may 
they may be expected to be directly interested in the stabilization of 
this market»1/ LastlyÏ the cocoa bean, included among those 
commoditiés requiring only finance commitments, is also regulated 
by an international agreement énvisaging thè operatión of a buffer 
stock, which has not yet had to enter into operation but for which 
funds are being collected in accordance with the,procedure laid down 
in the agreement. 
Among other commodities of export interest to the Latin American 
countries are sugar and cotton. No international buffer stock was 
included in the international sugar agreements existing in earlier 
years, but the agreement in force up to 1973 included detailed 
provisions concerning the minimum stocks which the exporting member 
countries should maintain, defined as a percentage of the basic 
tonnage assigned to each exporting country* and established an 
undertaking by exporting Countries to adjust their production so 
that the stocks held at the end of each trading year should not 
exceed a certain percentage in relation to total production, or 
to the basic export tonnage and domestic consumption requirements. . 
There was nò equivalent undertaking by importers, however. In 
any case, in view of the fragmentation of the international sugar 
market, the strong protection accorded to sugar production in most 
developed countries and the special arrangements regulating large 
areas of this trade (Lomé Convention, agreements.between Cuba and 
socialist countries), the operation of an international buffer 
stock would.probably require different objectives and regulations 
from those obtained for other commodities. Lastly, cotton is another 
commodity presenting special characteristics, both because the 
developed countries supply a large proportion of world exports, and, 
even more important, because this fibre is severely affected by 
1/ At the end of March 1976, a meeting was convened by UNCTAD with 
the participation of copper producers and consumers at which 
it was decided to set up an International Study Group on 
Copper (on the lines of the Study Group on Lead and Zinc), 
which is to meet for the first time in June next. 
/competition from 
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competition from synthetic fibres. It has always been recognized 
that, in the case of commodities facing a situation of this kind, 
the stabilization of prices cannot be achieved by means of regulating 
supply, since in all probability there will be further advances in 
the process of substitution. jIt is true that with the higher cost 
of inputs for the manufacture of synthetic materials, the problem 
of the replacement of natural products must be re-examined in the 
light of the new structure of costs and the price relationship 
between natural and synthetic products. In any case, the International 
Cotton Advisory Committee has for the first time considered it 
desirable that an international agreement should be negotiated on 
this commodity, so that the operation of a buffer stock may be 
included in that agreement. 
The list of commodities proposed by the secretariat of UNCTA.D 
for the setting up of buffer stocks may vary owing to important 
changes in the market situation of the various commodities (as noted 
earlier in the case of coffee), and the scale of the finance 
requirements and the scope of the objectives assigned to each 
stock would vary accordingly. For this reason, it is important to 
emphasize that the list of commodities proposed by the UNCTAD 
secretariat is merely intended for illustrative purposes. Moreover, 
it does not seem advisable that a list should be drawn' up at the 
fourth session of UNCTAD itself, because the result would probably be 
that each of the developing regions would wish to include as many 
as possible of their own export commodities, so that the list might 
be too long for practical purposes. Accordingly, the best course 
would seem to be the adoption of a policy decision to establish a 
small.but sufficiently representative intergovernmental group with 
a broad mandate to prepare the list of commodities of which stocks 
would be set up, together with the general rules for their operation. 
/The common 
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The common fund for the financing of buffer stocks, and the 
establishment of such stocks for a certain number of commodities of 
export interest to 'developing countries, are essential elements of 
the new approach to the treatment of commodity trade problems which 
the UNCTAD secretariat has wished to adopt. Certain objectives in 
connexion with commodity prices -cannot be attained unless adequate 
machinery is set up for the purpose. A buffer stock's intervention 
in a commodity market, where appropriate, is the most direct 
machinery for reducing or attenuating excessive price fluctuations 
and short-term instability, while at the same time providing the 
necessary interval for the effects of other complementary measures 
(export quotas, production adjustment, etc.) to make themselves 
felt.. Any buffer stock would obviously exhaust its financial-., 
resources, however considerable, if it tried to defend the price of 
a commodity which was affected by"a persistent imbalance between 
supply and demand. < 
"(c) Harmonization of stocking policies"and the setting up of 
co-ordinated national stocks financed, in the case of 
developing countries by the common fund referred to in 
sub-paragraph (a) aboire, or by international financial 
agencies through a broader and more liberal financing 
'scheme for buffer stocks." 
An alternative to the establishment of international buffer 
stocks is the establishment and maintenance of national stocks, 
particularly in the case of those- products which are exported mainly 
by developed countries but which-are also.of some significance in a 
certain number of developing countries. In the exploratory 
consultations.about international arrangements on cereals, for 
example, some of the main world exporting countries showed a 
preference for the establishment of national stocks instead of an 
international stock. A similar situation could occur in respect of 
wool, since some of the most important developed countries which 
export wool have domestic stabilization machinery for this product. 
Some non-ferrous metals could also form part of this group. 
• ' /When considering 
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When considering the possibility and desirability of setting 
up national stocks of certain products, it must be borne in mind 
that their administration and functioning must nevertheless be in 
keeping with a set of internationally agreed principles and 
objectives, so that the co-ordinated action of the different countries 
can achieve the desired objectives. It is perfectly conceivable that 
a number of national stocks can function just as efficiently as one 
international stock, provided that all of them are governed by the 
same set of rules, that those rules are not subject to arbitrary . 
interpretations or judgements, and that all the member countries of 
the network of stocks scrupulously adhere to the commitments they 
have entered into as regards the objectives set out for national 
stocks. So much for the operational side of the stocks. As regards 
the financing, two different situations must be taken into account: 
national, stocks set up by developed countries, which would be financed 
by each of the countries in question, and national stocks set up by 
developing countries, which would be financed, depending on the 
circumstances, either partly or wholly from the common fund for the 
financing of international stocks and/or from the funds of 
international financial organizations. The first alternative should 
be established as one of the regular practices of the common fund 
from its inception. The second requires the preparation of a set of 
principles and recommendations which could be approved by UNCTAD IV 
for submission to the study and consideration of the relevant 
international financial agencies so that the governing bodies of the 
latter can decide how to carry out or participate in such financing 
operations. Some background information needs to be considered in 
connexion with this point. 
In accordance with, a decision taken in mid-1969, the 
International Monetary Fund set up a credit facility for member • 
governments for the financing of buffer stocks, as a necessary 
complement to the compensatory financing facility set up some years 
ago. Credits for this purpose are granted directly to member countries 
/which have 
which have difficulties,in their balance of payments, so that they 
can participate in buffer stock agreements concluded under the basic 
commodity agreement and in line with the principles of intergovernmental 
relations approved by the United Nations. In an annex to the1* decision! 
mentioned above the Executive Directors of IMF laid down the criteria 
which would be applied in/granting credits for the financing of buffer 
stocks. First come the general principles for intergovernmental 
relations in commodity agreements. These principles are articles 60, 
63 and 65 of the Havana Charter, referring to participation, system of 
voting, equitable treatment and duration of commodity agreements. It 
is a little surprising that in this matter it was decided to make use 
of the principles of such an old document as the Havana Charter, which 
moreover was not ratified by the governments, instead of referring to 
the principles and rules contained in recommendation A.IléÎ'of the 
Final Act Of UNÇ.TAD I, which were adopted without dissent by all 
governments. -These obyiously have a broader and more liberal 
conception of, the functions and objectives of international product 
agreements than the corresponding provisions of the Havana Chartër. 
As already noted, in order to gain access to credit for the 
financing of buffer stocks applicant countries must be having 
difficulties with their balance of payments; moreover," thé amortization 
period, as in all drawings on IMF resources, is from 3 ¿0 5 years, 
with the special provision that the country concerned undertakes to 
make amortization payments in advance'if thé buffer fund makes cash 
payments to its members.l/ 
1/ The first transactions under this new credit facility took place 
in mid-1971 and were by countries which had to make contributions 
to the international tin reserve set up under the International 
Tin Agreement. In April 1973 the IMF decided that the members of 
the International Cocoa Agreement could obtain loans from the 
buffer stocks financing facility only for the purpose of building 
up the buffer stock and not in respect of purchases aimed at non-
traditional uses for cocoa. The evolution of the cocoa market has 
been such, however, that the intervention of this buffer stock has 
not so far been necessary. See International Monetary Fund, . 
Annual Report 1975 » J>» 52. 
/(d) "Negotiation 
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11 (d) Negotiation of other measures necessary for the attainment 
of the objectives of the programme within the framework 
of international commodity arrangements through, inter alia, 
appropriate international production policies, supply 
management measures, and bilateral and multilateral long-
term supply and purchase commitments, taking into.account 
the characteristics of each product." 
The measures considered so far are connected with the 
establishment and financing of buffer stocks*at the international or 
national level. Obviously, the operation Of buffer stocks is not 
necessary for all products, nór is it even possible in some cases, so 
that the objective of the stabilization of commodity prices within a 
general trend of expansion of the total export income of the 
developing countries must also be pursued through the adoption of 
other measures taken within the framework of agreements of traditional 
character or through other more limited arrangements negotiated or 
agreed by the developing countries which export ea.ch of the products 
in question. With regard to the traditional type of international 
commodity agreement, it may be noted that during 1975 the agreements 
on three commodities which are of interest in Latin American exports 
were renegotiated: the tin agreement, which has been renegotiated with 
modifications every five years since 1956; the cocoa agreement, which 
came into force for the first time on 30 June 1973 and has now been 
renewed for a further three-year period, and the coffee agreement, 
whose economic provisions have been suspended since October 1973 but 
which is to be extended for six years from October 1976 if it is 
ratified by a sufficient number of exporting and importing member 
countries. Conferences on the renegotiation of the sugar and wheat 
agreements are to be held during the present year, and if these- are 
successful it will mean that by the end of 1976 the situation existing 
at the begining of the present decade will have been restored as 
regards international commodity agreements. 
/The results 
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The results obtained in the last twenty years in the 
negotiation of international commodity agreements involving the 
participation of a significant majority of the importing' or consuming 
countries have not been very encouraging, to judge by the very small 
number of" commodities in respect of which it has been possible to 
negotiate such agreements. The discussions at the Seventh Special 
Session of the General Assembly last September and the consensus 
reached on resolution 3362 (S-VÏI) adopted at the same session seemed 
to indicate that there had been a fundamental change in the negative 
attitude or outright opposition of some developed countries 
(particularly the United States) to international commodity 
agreements. Some subsequent events suggest that the change haô not 
been as fundamental as it seemed, however. Thus, for example, the 
Executive Branch of the United States Govérnment has proposed to 
Congress that the agreements on coffee and tin should be ratified, 
but it has stated that the United States will not participate in the-
cocoa agreement. Furthermore, there hais been continuing duality of 
opinions and public statements between the Department of State and 
the Department of the Treasury of the United States regarding the 
question of whether or not that country is to participate in 
international commodity agreements,!/ and moreover the United States 
representative has indicated, in official statements regarding the 
proposals made by his country at the Seventh Special Session in 
connexion with thé liberalization of the compensatory financing 
facility and the modifications which thé Executive Directors of IMF 
agreed to make in that facility at thé end of lâst December, that 
the liberalization Of compensatory financing had been proposed as an 
alternative to the negotiation"of international commodity agreements, 
which, in his opinion, had other undesirable consequences.^/ 
1/ See "Washington Post", 15 February 1976, p. 
2/ See "Statement by Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan, United States 
representative, to the United Nations before the 21st Session of 
the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme", 
United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release 
USUN-12 (1976), 27 January 1976. 
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All this does not mean, of course, that the developing 
countries should give up or reduce their efforts to induce the 
developed and socialist countries to participate in international 
consultations and conferences which could eventually lead to the 
negotiation of international commodity agreements involving either 
market regulation machinery such as the operation of buffer stocks, 
export quotas or other mechanisms for achieving specific levels of 
prices in real terms, or incorporating in accordance with the 
particular characteristics of each commodity, other types of 
international arrangements which could be made operative with the 
concerted action of. the developing countries. The specific 
characteristics which these other types of arrangements may have for 
particular products could be identified by taking as the starting 
point the organization of producers' associations, the promotion and 
operation of which was recommended in the Programme of Action for 
the Establishment of a New International Economic Order in 
resolution 3202 (S-VI) adopted at the Sixth Special Session of the 
General Assembly. The organization of producers' associations is not 
a recent invention, but the.success of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in fixing prices for oil has enabled the 
developed countries to use this example to condemn any attempt at 
organization of the developing exporting countries. It is obvious, 
however, that it is not possible to make generalizations in this 
respect. The information available shows that producers' associations 
have operated in different forms and have achieved different degrees 
fo success in pursuing their objectives. Thus, for example, before 
the present International Cocoa Agreement there was the "Alliance of 
Cocoa Producers" (an association of developing cocoa producing and 
exporting countries), which failed to achieve positive results in 
in its attempts to stabilize the international cocoa market in the 
/middle of 
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middle of the past decade because among other reasons, it had no 
buffer stock and lacked financial resources. The Intergovernmental 
Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC), which is also an 
association of' developing producer countries and was set up in 1967» 
has served as a mechanism for permenent consultations so that its 
member countries can take decisions on, inter alia, the volume of 
production and exports of copper in accordance with the general 
trends of the international merket for that product. . It did not 
succeed in preventing the sharp drop in copper prices in 1975, but 
it must be acknowledged that conditions were extremely difficult 
at that time owing to the world recession. Since then, other 
associations have been set up, including the International Bauxite 
Association, the Association of Iron Ore Exporting Countries, the 
Association of Tungsten Producers, and, in the agricultural field, 
the Union of Banana Exporting Countries (UPEB) and the Economic Group 
of Latin American and Caribbean Sugar Exporting Countries (GEPLACEA). 
Each of these producers' associations, made up completely or largely 
of developing exporting countries, has the basic character of a. 
multilateral consultation and co-operation body, but they can also 
set themselves other objectives according to the characteristics of 
each product and the specific market conditions, including the 
formulation and application of a price policy,!/ the establishment 
1/ Paragraph 75 of the "Chaguaramas Appraisal - Second Regional 
Appraisal of the International Development Strategy and . 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order", which 
was adopted in ECLA resolutión Jbj (XVI), says: "The Latin 
American countries propose to explore, primarily with the 
participation of developing countries in other regions, every 
possibility of establishing producers' associations, and 
affirm their decision to convert them into useful instruments 
for the formulation and implementation of a basic commodity 
price policy in line with the principles of fair prices for 
producers and the necessary increase in the income of exporting 
countries". See "The regional evaluations of the International 
Development Strategy", ECLA Cuaderno NQ 2, Santiago, Chile, 1975-
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of arrangements to control supply, the adoption of arrangements for 
arriving at suitable production policies, and the formulation and 
adoption of measures to enable them to secure a bigger share of the 
final price (the price paid by the consumer) of the products they 
export. 
"(e) Effective application of appropriate measures and 
procedures for indexing the price of commodities exported 
by developing countries to the prices of manufactures 
imported from developed countries." 
In the domestic policies of the developed countries, the 
maintenance of remunerative prices for producers has always been a 
fundamental objective, achieved through the fixing of guaranteed 
minimum prices for producers or through the granting of direct 
subsidies. At the international level, however, it has proved very 
difficult to apply any of the principles or policies commonly used 
for managing domestic markets. In the few commodity agreements 
negotiated in past years, one of the most difficult aspects in the 
negotiations was always that of establishing the price margins within 
which an attempt was to be made to stabilize the market for the 
products in question by putting into action the various types of 
regulatory machinery laid down in the agreement. Generally, in order 
to prevent a persistent decline in prices, the developing producer 
countries had to apply export restrictions, with the result that the 
economic and social cost of restoring relative balance to the market 
fell entirely on the exporting countries themselves, even though 
the causes of the imbalance in the' market may have lain in measures 
adopted by the importing countries. 
/Commodity price 
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Commodity price policy has another aspect, however, which has 
even greater repercussions: namely, that of the price in real terms 
(i.e...,. taking into account its purchasing yovrer)." In the recommendations 
of the Final Act of UNCTAD I it was recognized that one of the 
.Objectives of international commodity agreements should be that of 
guaranteeing stable, just and remunerative prices for basic 
commodities - especially those exported by the developing countries -
taking due account of the purchasing power of the commodities exported 
in terms of imports. .  
This recommendation was not applied in any of thè commodity 
agreements negotiated in previous years, and it was strongly opposed 
by some developed countries when the exporting member countries of 
the International Coffe.e Agreement tried to make a small adjustment 
in the referènce price of coffee to compensate for the devaluation 
of the dollar with respect to other currencies. The increased 
severity of inflation in the developed countries in the last three 
years, howéver, and the" changes which have taken place in the 
monetary parities of the main trading centres have placed this 
problem"of fixing commodity prices in real terms in the foreground 
" ; of the developing countries' concerns. 
In order to illustrate the foregoing, table 3 shows the losses 
suffered by the purchasing power of the dollar in terms of three 
different price indexes: that of the unit value of exports of 
- manufactures from the developed countries as a whole; that of the 
unit value of total exports of the United States, and that of 
retail price movements in that country. It will be noted from this 
table that the annual variations in these indexes were relatively / 
small between 1953 and 1969, but from 1970 onwards, the'annual rises 
were very large, and in 1973 and 197^ they reached unprecendented 
levels. In line with the practice of international organizations, 
this table takes the index of the unit valué .of exports*of 
manufactures of the developed countries as an index of international 
inflation in order to deflate'the current prices of Latin American 
commodity exports so as to . obtain.-series of prices in real terms for 
them. This has also been done in table 4 for the products of greatest , 




























Purchasing power of dollar 
Measure- Measure Measure 
by A ty B by C 
1953 IOO.3 1 0 0 . 5 99.7 0.997 0.995 1.003 
1954 99.1 99.2 1 0 0 . 2 1 . 0 0 9 I.008 0 . 9 9 8 
1955 100.3 1 0 0 . 2 99.1 0.997 0 . 9 9 8 I.009 
1956 104.1 I 0 3 . 9 101.4 O.961 0 . 9 6 2 0 . 9 8 6 
1957 I O 6 . 7 107.4 105.0 O.937 0.931 0.952 
1958 1 0 5 . 4 I 0 6 . 2 107.8 O.949 0,942 0 . 9 2 8 
1959 104.1 106.4 108.7 O.96I 0 . 9 4 0 0 . 9 2 0 
i 9 6 0 1 0 6 . 7 107.2 110.5 0.937 0.933 0.905 
1 9 6 1 108.0 I O 9 . 3 111.6 O.926 0.915 0 . 8 9 6 
1962 108.0 108.5 112.8 O.926 0 . 9 2 2 0 . 8 8 6 
1 9 6 3 1 0 9 . 2 I O 8 . 3 114.2 O . 9 I 6 0 . 9 2 3 0 . 8 7 6 
1964 110.4 109.4 115.7 0 . 9 0 6 0 . 9 1 4 0.864 
1965 1 1 3 . 0 112 ¿9 117.7 0,885 0 . 8 8 6 0 . 8 5 0 
1966 114,3 116.4 121.0 0.875 0 . 8 5 9 0 . 8 2 6 
1967 115.6 118.6 124.5 O . 8 6 5 0.843 0 . 8 0 3 
1 9 6 8 115.6 120.3 1 2 9 . 8 O . 8 6 5 0 . 8 3 1 0 . 7 7 0 
1 9 6 9 116.8 124.2 1 3 6 . 7 O . 8 5 6 0 . 8 0 5 0 . 7 3 1 
1970 127.0 131.3 144.8 0.787 0 . 7 6 2 0 . 6 9 1 
1971 133.4 135.5 151.1 O . 7 5 O 0 . 7 3 8 0 . 6 6 2 
1972 144.8 I 3 9 . 5 I 5 6 . 0 O . 6 9 I 0.717 o.64i 
1973 1 6 8 . 9 I 6 3 . I 1 6 5 . 8 0.592 0 . 6 1 3 0 . 6 0 3 
1974 2 0 5 . 8 2 0 8 . 2 1 8 3 . 9 0.486 0.480 0 . 5 4 4 
1975 2 3 1 . 3 232.4 2 0 0 . 7 0 . 4 3 2 0 . 4 3 0 0 . 4 9 8 
1974 
1 s t quarter 184.2 192.9 176.1 0.543 0 . 5 1 8 0 . 5 6 8 
2nd quarter 204.6 200.2 181.1 0 . 4 8 9 0.499 0 . 5 5 2 
3 r d quarter 212.2 213.5 1 8 6 . 7 0 . 4 7 1 0.468 0 . 5 3 6 
4 t h quarter 222.4 226.7 I 9 2 . 0 0 . 4 5 0 0.441 0 . 5 2 1 
1975 
ist quarter 237.6 234.4 195.5 0.421 0.427 0 . 5 1 2 
2nd quarter 238.9 232.7 198.5 0 . 4 1 9 0 . 4 3 0 0 . 5 0 4 
3 r d quarter 226.6* 231.1 2 0 2 . 8 0.441 0 . 4 3 3 0 . 4 9 3 
quarter 223.6* 232.7 2 0 6 . 1 0.447 0 . 4 3 0 0.485 
Souroei United Nations, Monthly Statistical Bulletin for the index of unit value of the exports of 
manufactures of the developed countries, United States Department of Commerce,"Business Statistic 
1971" and "Survey of Current Business" for the other two Indexes. 
§/ The purchasing power of the dollar is expressed in constant dollars and cents of the period 1953-1955« 




PRICES OP UTS! AI-ERICA tS M'.Eî G013¡ODrrY SCPOKTS, ET CIBREI DOLLARS 
Aim ET COI'ST AIT 1?53-1J55 DOLLARS a/ 
Year 
Susar b/ Sugar 0 / Coffee d/ Coffee e/ Cocoa # 
• ... 
A c A B A- B. A B A B 
I952 4.17 6.02 " 1 M * " " X 3 ""liX" 
I953 3.41 3.41 6.29 6.29 57 .9 57.9 59.3 59,8 34.9 34,9 
1954 3.26 3.29 6.09 6 . 1 5 78.7 79.4. 80.0 Oo.O 55.7 56,3 
I955 3.24 3.24 5.95 5.95 57.1 57.1 64.6 64.6 36.2 36.2 
1956 3 . 4 7 3.30 6.09 5.86 53.1 55.3 74.0 70.4 25,5 24,3 
1957 5.16 4.82 6.24 . 5.83 56.9 53.2 63.9 5 9,7 30,5 28,5 
I953 3.50 3.30 6.27 . 5.97 4Ö.4 45.7 52,3 49.3 43,3 4o.8 
1959 2.97 2.83 6.24 6.00 37.0 35.2 45.2 43,0 35,4 33,7 
i960' 3.14 2.93 6.30 5.89 36.6 34.2 44.9 42,0 26.8 25,0 
I96I 2 .70 2.50 6.30 5.32 36.0 33.3 42.6 40.4 22,4 20,7 
1962 2. CO 2.59 6.45 5.97 34.0 31.4 4o,3 37,8 21 ,3 19,7 
I963 3.31 7.62 8.18 7.50 34,1 31.3 39.6 36.3 26.5 24.3 
1964 5.7 3 5.21 6.90 6,27 46.7 42,4 48,0 44,4 23,2 21.1 
1965 2.02 1.79 6.75 5.97 44.7 39.6 43.5 42.9 16.9 1 5 . 0 
I966 1.31 1.59 6.99 6.13 4o.O 35.8 47,4 41.6 23.0 20.2 
1967 1.92 i .67 7.28 6,28 37.3 32,9 41.9 36.4 26.4 23.0 
I96S I.90 1.65 7,52 6,40 37.4 32.5 42,6 37.0 32.9 28.6 
1969 3.20 2.73 7.83 6.69 4o.8 35.4 45.0 39.1 43.5 37,8 
1970 3.69 2 .91 8.07 . 6.35 54.6 43.0 56,4 44.4 22.3 25,4 
1971 4.50 3.3O 8.52 6.4l 44.8 33.7 49,3 37.1 25.8 19,4 
1972 7.2 7 5.01 9.07 6.26 51.0 35.2 56.7 39.1 21,1 21,4 
1973 9.45 5.59 10,29 6,09 66.9 39.6 72.7 43.0 61.I 36,2 
1974 29.70 14.42 29.50 14.32 r ft «1 00*1 33.1 77.3 37.0 08.4 42,9 
1975 20,43 8.83 22,46 9.70 77.9 33.7 81.7 35.3 64.2 2 7,7 
1974 1 " quarti 9 , 1 2 I6.3C 15.95 3.67 72.0 39.1 77.9 42,3 70.6 38,4 
2 n d quart22.51 11,20 22.90 11.17 73.1 35,7 81,7 39.8 101.6 49,6 
3 r d quart29.94 14.12 31.54 14.30 63.0 29,7 74,9 35.2 92.4 43,6 
V t h quart.46.04 21.10 47.59 21.44 64.1 28.9 76.0 " 24.6 00,9 40,0 
I975 1 s t quart. 32.90 13.35 34.94 l4.7o 71.5 3Ö.0 75.6 21.8 70.1 32.9 
2 n d quart. 1 8 . 3 2 7.68 20.33 3.54 70,9 29.7 63.4 23,6 57.0 23.4 
3 r 4 quart. 16. 93 7.46 19.39 8.55 91.3 4o,3 91.6 4o,4 60.9 26.9 
•V4 quarU3,53 6.07 15.12 6.76 Ho quotation 9 1 . 1 4o,7 60,6* 2 7 . 1 
Bananas g/ Beefy '/heat i/ llaize j/ Cotton y/ 
A B. A B A B X B A B 
1952 """IM**" 53.3 74.3 70.3 105,0 101.0 54,8 52.2 
I953 7.4 7.4 62.7 62.7 . 76.6 76.6 73.5 70.5 41.4 41.4 
1954 7.6 7.7 51.8 . 52.3 69.5 70.3 72,3 7 4 . 0 36.9 37.3 
1955 7.5 7.5 60,8 60.8 64.3 64.3 81.6 81.6 35.4 35.4 
1956 7.6 7.2 47.0 45.2 62.3 59.3 86,7 77,6 30.9 29.4 
1957 3,0 7.4 49.0 45.0 62.1 58.0 73,0 63,2 30.2 28.2 
1958 7.4 7.0 57.4 54.7 62.1 58.6 58,4 55.6 27,3 25.8 
1959 6.6 6.3 61.3 58.9 61 .4 53.4 58,4 56,2 25,1 23.9 
i960 6.5 6.1 75.0 7o.l 61.4 57.4 59,5 55,6 26,3 24,6 
1961 6.3 5.8 70.6 65.4 62.1 57.5 59.1 54,7 28.0 25,9 
1962 6.0 5.6 73.6 60.1 63,3 50,6 57,3 52,1 26,7 24,7 
1963 7.6 7.0 63.3 62.7 64.6 59.3 64,0 59,4 26.5 24.3 
1964 7.7 7.0 36.0. 73.7 67,4 61.3 66.6 60.5 26,1 23.7 
1965 7,2 6,4 92.7 82*0 59,5 52.7 72,0 64.4 ' 26,2 23,2 
1966 • 7,o 6.1 86.5 75.9 62.8 55.1 72.0 63.2 24,4 21.4 
1967 7.2 6.3 84.4 72.7 65.0. 57.2 53,1 50.I 26,4 23.0 
I96O 6.9 6.0 Mo quotation 62.O 54.5 60,9 52.5 27.1 23.6 
1969 7.2 6.3 36.6 1/ 74.0 53.4 50.0 66,1 56.4 23,4 20.3 
i f / o 7.5 5.9 135.8 146.3 54.7 43.1 68.9 54.3 26.6 20.9 
1971 6.4 4.0 223.3 " 167.9 61.7 46.4 . 66.7 50.2 32,3 24.3 
1972 7.3 5.0 249.6 172.1 69.3 40,1 71,6 49.4 33,6 23.2 
1973 4.4 317.6 187.9 137,3 8Ï.5 110.8 7Ó.3 51,9 20.7 
1974 7.3 2.8 246.4 168.2 180.9 87,8 15O.9 73,6 65,9 ' 32.0 
1975 9.9 4.3 . «M 151 .O 65,2 149,7 64,7 5i,o 22.0 
I974 1«"* quart. 7.2 4.0 302.3 164.4 211,8 115,1 155.0 84,2 76.4 41,5 
2"* quart, u.3 4.0 386.2 100,4 151.3 73.8 l4o,S .'fv 74,1 36.1 
quart. 7.9 3.7 250.1 1 6 5 . 1 17Ö.4 80.4 163,5 80,7 60,0 28.7 
quart. 7.7 3.4 Ko quotation 190.0 85.6 173,9 ffiL.0 52,2 23.5 
1975 1 s t quart. i0.7 
SPà quart. 11.1 
3 r d quart. 3.0 
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Table 4 (conclusion) 
'Tool j/ Linseed olì 0/ Copper j>/ Tin^ 
Year 
& B it B B A B 
~ 7 T ™ s ' c i T r ™ 7 6 3 Ï 7 ~~ " " 7 1 ? ™ " " T * 6 5 3 ~ " 2 531 
1953 74 74 2 3 7 . 0 2 3 7 . 0 664 664 2 014 2 014 
1954 7 9 80 l S o . 2 1Ö2.0 685 692 1 98I 2 001 
1955 82 82 246,6 246.6 968 968 2 040 2 040 
1 9 5 5 83 , 79 3 2 8 . 3 3 I 3 . I 906 063 2 l 7 l 2 O68 
1957 90 84 2 7 0 , 6 2 5 2 , 9 . 605 565 2 080 1 9*44 
1950 66 62 2 6 6 . 2 2 5 1 . 1 544 513 2 026 1 911 
1959 7 5 7 1 2 4 5 , 5 2 3 3 , 3 655 624 2 164 2 06I 
i960 80 75 2 5 7 , 7 2 4 o , 3 673 634 2 195 2 05I 
1 5 6 1 7 7 7 1 2O0.5 2 5 9 . 7 633 586 2 447 2 266 
1?62 66 6 1 2 5 3 , 8 2 3 5 . 0 645 597 2 4 7 1 2 233 
15-63 81 74 212,7 I 9 5 . I 646 593 . 2 507 2 300 
1964 O9 01 2 3 7 , 0 ¡215.4 968 38o 3 409 3 099 
1965 73 65 2 1 3 . 6 139.0 1 290 1 142 3 893 3 445 
1956 68 60 1 5 1 . 5 1 6 3,0 1 530 1 3^2 3 574 3 135 
1 9 6 7 45 39 204.2 1 7 7 . 6 1 1 3 8 990 3 330 2 Û96 
1968 44 33 2 3 4 , 3 204,2 1 241 1 079 3 12/ 2 7 1 9 
19S9 40 42 2 3 7 , 4 206,4 1 466 1 275 3 428 2 931 
i ? 7 o 48 38 2 2 6 . 5 ^ 8 , 3 1 4 1 3 1 112 3 2 893 
1 9 7 1 50 38' 1 9 4 . 1 1 4 5 . 9 1 081 313 . 3 500 2 632 
1972 83 57 206,4 1 4 2 . 3 1 o 7 l 739 3 765 2 596 
1973 145 86 562.4 532.3 1 734 1 056 4 326 2 856 
19/4 125 6 1 1 1 2 7 . 0 '547.1 2 060 1 000 8 190 3 976 
1 9 7 5 ' - m 7 4 3 . 0 3 2 1 . 0 1 234 533 6 863 2 965 
1 9 7 4 1 s t quarter 1 5 0 02 1 1 3 4 , 8 S l 6 , 7 2 357 1 2 Cl •7 435 4 o4l 
2 n d quarter 1 5 0 73 1 076.8 5 2 5 , 3 2 785 1 353 5 1 6 9 4 4 7 3 
3rd quarter 1 0 1 48 1 1 1 4 . 2 525,6 1 723 315 8 823 4 162 
4th quarter 1 0 1 45 1 1 8 3 . 1 532,9 
j 
1 368 616 7 333 3 303 
1975 1st quarter 1 0 1 42 04Ó.O 3 5 6 , 1 1 273 536 7 527 3 I 6 9 
2nd quarter lio quotation 8 1 1 . 0 3 3 9 . 3 1 250 52 7 6 981 2 925 
3rd quarter l!o quotation 7 0 9 . 0 312,7 1 236 545 6 634 2 948 
4th quarter ilo quotation 6 0 7 . 0 ¿ 7 1 . 3 1 1 6 9 523 6 259 2 798 
H o t e : Column Ax International price in ourrent dollars. ! 
Column B: Adjusted price: international price de£Iated|by the index of unit value of the e::ports of 
manufactures of the developed countries (1953-1955 81 100), 
vj Current prices deflated by the index of unit value of the{exports of manufactures of the developed countries 
(1953-1955 » 100). j 
b/ Raw su^ar, US cents per pound FOB Caribbean ports, for e:qiort to' the free market. 
0/ Raw su^ar, US oents per pound in I!ew Yor!:, including iuport duty. 
d/ Santos H° 4 Brazilian ooffee beans, US oents per pound in jl'ei; Yor!:, 
js>/ Colombian ilardzalea coffee, US cents per pound in ileir Yor':. 
sj Baliia cocoa, U3 oents per pound in Uew Yor!:» ' 
rj Central Auerior.n Bananas, ii.S3orter,-to-distributor price FOB United States port of entiy, 
h/ Argentine beef, US cents per ,'rilo; up to 1969, chilled hindquarters wholesale on the London ii-rket, 
2 Hard Red 'Sinter wheat, United States export price FOB, Gulf ports, in US dollars per ton. 
j/ Yellow La Plo.ta naize: up to I5S5, CIF Liverpool and London, thereafter CI? Rotterdam, in US dollars per ton. 
v/ Sao Paulo I!0 5 cotton, import price CIF Liverpool in US oents per pound, 
l/ From 1J70 onwjrds, boned meat, 1 
jj/ From 1?73 onwards, price CIF Hamburg, I 
vj Argentine \rool, "type Buenos Aires 40-36, import price in warehouse, Boston, in US oents per pound*. 
0/ Fron 1952 to Kcj' 1957, Argentine and Urujjoi'an linsead oil!; from June 1957 to 1970, Ar-entine oil only, and 
from 19/1 onwards, Arcentine and any other linseed oil, inj dollars per ton. 
Electrolytic copper, Chilean producers' price in dollars p|er ton, 
g/ Tin: spot prioes on the London lietals in dollars ?er ton. 
/ I t seems 
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It seems unnecessary to comment on the results revealed by these 
two tables. In the period between 1955 and 197^ the dollar lost a 
little over half its purchasing power* -and it continued to.go down 
rapidly during 1975. Consequently, during the 1960s the prices in 
real terms of the majority of Latin American commodity exports were 
below those of the previous decade^ In the period 1973-̂ 197̂ » a set 
of circumstantial factors (production shortfalls in some cases, 
speculative pressures encouraged by exchange instability in others) 
gave rise to a spectacular increase in thé current prices of many 
commodities, so that in some cases they recovered the levels of real 
prices reached in previous periods and in'others even exceeded them. 
This situation was very transient, however, and it began to change 
again for a number of commodities from the middle of 197^ onwards, 
so that already by:the end of 1975 the real prices of many of these' 
had declined to the depressed levels of the previous decadé. It 
should also bè-borne in mind that in calculating these prices in 
real terms we have taken the index of unit value of exports of 
manufactures of the developed countries on an f.o.b basis, that is to 
say, not including freight charges, insurance, commissions'and other 
charges which affect the cost of.the' developing countries' imports. 
The discussions regarding indexing.show that there is likely 
to.i be great difficulty in reaching agreement on this matter. On 
the other hand, there can be no doubt that the developing countries 
have suffered severe erosion of their purchasing power, because the 
prices of their commodity exports have undergone frequent and 
prolonged declines, whereas the rise in the price of the manufactures 
and. other goods imported by them has been continual and uninterrupted. 
This unequal state of affairs did not constitute a very serious • 
problem in the last ;two decades, because the increase in the prices • 
of imported products was genérally not more than 2 per cent per 
year. In recent,years, however¿inflation in-the developed countries 
has reached unprecendentedly high levels, and even though it is 
hoped to bring these down the projections made suggest that this 
inflation will remain between 8 and 10 per cent-per year for the 
/next few 
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next few years. In these circumstances, it is essential to work out 
measures or procedures to safeguard thé prices in real terms of the 
commodities exported by the developing countries. In the case of 
the commodities for which there is a buffer stock, this could be 
done by reviewing the range of prices in current terms which governs 
the intervention or non-intervention of the buffer stock in the 
market at three-monthly or six-monthly intervals or whenever 
considered appropriate in view of the particular characteristics of 
the market for the commodity in question. In other cases, the 
exporting countries could arrive at understandings on minimum.export 
prices or could impose certain charges on exports, taking into account 
in each case the index of international inflation. 
Only through measures of this or a similar kind would it be 
possible to think seriously of reaching some of the objectives set 
forth in the Manily Programme': of Action, such as the improvement,of 
the terms of trade and the maintenance of commodity prices ât levels 
which in terms of real value are remunerative and just for producers 
and consumers. 
It is interesting to note in this respect that in the 
international commodity agreements renegotiated in the course of 
1975 (cocoa, coffee and tin, as mentioned above) the provisions 
relating to prices are broader and give the administrative Council 
of each agreement the authority to revise the scale or range of 
prices, with the aim that this periodical revision should take into 
consideration not only factors relating to the levels of production 
and consumption and the volume of stocks in the importing and 
exporting countries, but also the influence on prices of the changes 
in exchange rates, world inflationary or deflationary trends or the 
changes which may occur in the world monetary system. 
It may be useful to review the relevant text of the agreements 
inasmuch as they reprèsent a positive innovation with regard to the 
previous agreements. . 
Article 38, paragraph 3, of the new International Coffee 
Agreement states that in establishing and adjusting any price range, 
/the Council 
the Council shall take into consideration, the prevailing level and 
trend of .coffee prices;including the influence thereon of: the 
levels and trends of consumption and production as well as stocks 
in importing and exporting countries; changes in the world monetary 
systems; the, trend-of world inflation or deflation and any other 
factors which might affect the achievement of the objectives set " 
out in the Agreement.!/ • -
In the new International Cocoa Agreement, renegotiated for a 
period of three years;, the relevant provisions are .contained in 
article 29, paragraph k: 
H . In conducting the review of prices referred to in 
paragraphs 2 and 3 the Council shall take into consideration the trend 
of cocoa prices, consumption, production, stocks, the influence on 
cocoa prices of changes in the world economic situation or monetary 
system and any other factors which might affect-the achievement of 
the objectives «et. out in this Agreement".2/ 
In the Fifth, International Tin Agreemènt, .which will enter 
into force in July 1976;when the Fourth Agreement, currently in force, 
expires, the provisions on prisees are contained in articles 27 and 31. 
Article 27 (d). provides: . . > ' , ' — 
"The Council shall, at i'ts first ordinary seèS'ion after the. •• ' 
entry into, force of this Agreement and, based òn continuing studies* 
at any time thereafter,or in accordance with the provisions of 
article 31, consider whether the floor and ceiling prices are • 
appropriate.for' the attainment of the objectives of this Agreement 
and may revise.either or both Of them ..»". 
"In so doing, the Council shall take into account the short-
term developments and medium-term trends of tin production, the 
production cost of tin and the level of tin production and 
consumption, the existing capacity for mine production, the adequacy 
1/ International Coffee Agreement 1976. ... 
2/ International Cocoa Agreement 1975« Text established at the V: 
final plenary meeting of ,<the Conference, held on 20 October 
1975. Document TD/C0C0A.V8. , . 
/of the 
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of the current price to maintain sufficient future mine production 
capacity and other relevant factors affecting movements in the price 
of tin." 
Article 31 provides: 
"(a) the Executive Chairman may convene or any participating 
country may request him to convene, a session of the Council 
immediately to review the floor and ceiling prices if the Executive 
Chairman or the participating country, as the case may be, considers 
that changes in exchange rates make such a review necessary. Sessions 
may be convened under this paragraph at less than seven days 
notice".1/ 
The indexation of commodity prices (i.e. the maintenance of 
prices in real terms) has also raised some anxiety in̂  developing 
countries as big importers of certain products, particularly food. 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 have been prepared in order to examine the 
relative position of each of the Latin American countries as an 
exporter or importer of a selected group of commodities. 
Table 5 shows that for 16 of the25 countries of the area, 
some of these products represented over 50 per cent (on average) 
of the total exports of goods in 1970-1972, and for another 
3 countries this percentage was over 35 per cent. The most notable 
exceptions are Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago, oil-exporting 
countries, and the Bahamas, a centre for the refining of petroleum 
products. From the import standpoint, Chile has the highest percentage 
of and greatest dependence on imports of various products, but for 
the rest of the countries the impact of imports is relatively moderate. 





PERCECTABE SHARE OP MAIM CCMHODITY EXPORTS IN TOTAL VALUE 
CP EXPORTS OF EACH COUNTRY AND <F THE REGION 
(Average for period 1970-1972) 
Sugar . . ... Copper Tin Sub-
Cocoa Coffee Tea Rubber Cottoij,, S i sa l Jute . „ . „ to ta l 
Argentina 0.? - - 0.6 m • 0 . 5 - - 0.2 2.2 
Bolivia o.4 - 1 . 8 «• o«4' 0.9 m - 3.1 50.1 56.8 
Brazil 7.1 2 . 1 28.0 0.1 0 . 1 5.0. 0.6 ' m 0.; 43.1 
Colombia 2 . 9 - 59-4 m m - mm «• m 66.7 
Costa Rica M 0.9 28.6 m m 0.1 - m m m 34.4 
Cuba 71.8 
A •. -
0 . 2 «» m m mm *m m mm 72.0 
Chile m • m - m m - m 7U6 0.4 72.0 
Ecuador s*2 9 . 2 16.8 0 . 1 m m- - m - mm 31.4 
El Salvador' 4.7 42.1 1 ** m 1 2 . 0 - - mm mm 58.8 
Guatemala ' 3.8 0 . 1 33.0 m 1 0 . 0 - - mm 46^ 
Haiti ¿.8 1.1+ 44.0 m 2.3 m mm - 5H.6 
Honduras - 14.7 0 . 1 , 0 . 4 - mm 1 6 . 1 
Mexioo 6 . 0 0 . 3 . •m. 0*2 8.3 0.6 - 1 . 1 ' m 22.3 
Nioaragua 6 . 2 0 . 1 15.8 . * m - 2 3 . 2 k - - - - .. 45.3 
Panama 4.9 0 . 1 - 1.6 k ' - . m - 6.5 
Paraguay 1.0 - 2.4 - - 4.0 mm mm - m • 7.* 
Peru 7.4 4 - ,4.4 mm •* 5.0 , - m 2 1 . 7 0 . 4 38.? 
Dominican Republic U8.9 5.? 10.2 - - •  m m m - • 65.0 
Ukuguay - - m m mm - - - -
Venezuela 0.4 0 . 2 0.5 m- m • m mm mm- - 1 . 1 
Total 20 Countries Ssl 0 . 8 " iSsi 0 . 1 0 . 1 hi 0 . 2 m 6+1 0 . 8 
Bahama 0.1+ m m - w m m m •» mm 
Barbados 35»6 - - - m- m m - m m 3 5 . 6 
Giyana 30.7 0.1 mm 0.3 m • - - m » 31.1 
Jamaica 11.0 0 . 3 0.4 mm m - mm - m m 1 1 . 6 
Trinidad and Tobago 4.7 ; 0 . 7 0.4 - mm • - m- • • • 5.7 
Total Latin America ¿a' M . 1 1 . 2 0 . 1 0 . 1 • 2sl • 0.2 m y i ' : 0£ 2 M 
/Table 5 (concluded) 
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Argentina - 5.2 0.4 17.4 3.8 m mm 2 9 . O 
Bolivia Mk - 0.1 ~ - - mm 56.9 
Brazil 0.3 - 0 . 2 3.5 0 . 3 7.0 m 54.4 
Colombia 2 . 1 m - 2.3 - - m 71.1 
Costa Rica 29.3 - a* 9.1 - m mm 72.8 
Cuba " - m « m - mm • - 72.0 
Chile - - - 0.4 6.3 - . 78.7 
Ecuador 39.6 - - - m mm - 71.0 
El Salvador m- - 0.1 0 . 8 mm mm - 59.7 
Guatemala W m 0.1 5.2 mm mm •mm • 5 6 . 8 
Haiti m- m m 1.6 m • 15.2 71.4 
Honduras 45.1 •• 6 . 9 •» - m 68.1 
Mexico - o.4 «» - 3.0 m> • mm 25.7 
Nicaragua 0 , 6 - 0 . 8 15.7 m - - 62.4 
Panama 53.9 m 2 . 0 0.1 - 6 2 . 5 
Paraguay - - •mm 1 2 . 8 m - - - 2 0 . 2 
Peru m- - - 6.7 •• 45.6 
Dominican Republio 0.3 „ — 1 . 6 / m mm 5.7 .;. 7 2 . 6 
Uruguay m 2.7 34,7 18.3 mm 
1 
56.6 
Venezuela m- 0.1 —i" m • 4.5 5.7 
Total 20 countries 2;3 0 . 6 0.2 4j2 0.8 3.2 0.1 42.8 
Bahamas - m - mm - m •• 0.4 
Barbados m - 0.2 mm - - 35-8 
Guyana m • 0 , 2 7.4 m m 0.1 2 7 . 6 66.4 
Jamaioa 4.1 m mm - mm mm 25.4 41.1 
Trinidad and Tobago mm - mm • - mm m• 0.1 5-8 
Total Latin America 2.2 0.6 0.2 hi °fZ £•2 41.2 
Sourcet Data taken from IBRD, Commodity Trade and Price Trends (1975 edition), op, clt. 




PERCENTAGE SHARE OP MAIN COMMODITY IMPORTS IN TOTAL VALUE 
® IMPORTS OP EACH COUNTRY AND OF THE REGION 
(Average for period 1970-1972) 
-Sisal Jute 
ÏÏTÏ C o o o a C o f f e e ? e a R u b b e P C o t t e n ffbroa others T l n t o t a l 
Z i ¡/(072.1) (071.1) (074.1) (231.1) (263.1) n - s ^ (68M) (10 pr* 
- f&ft 265.8) • duCtg) 
Argentina - 0,3, 1 . 9 0.6 0 . 8 • 0.1 2 . 2 0 . 3 6.2 
Bolivia mm m - 0 . 2 m• m «• mm 0.2 
Brazil - • m • • a mm 0.3 - 2.3 m • 2.6 
Colombia - 0 . 9 - - 0.4 0.1 - - 0 . 2 0 . 1 1 . 7 
Costa Rica m . m •mm. 0.1 0,1 0 . 2 - • 4M mm - 0.4 
Cuba - - • mm - - 0.1 1 . 0 - mm - - 1 . 1 
Chile 1.4 o.l 1 . 2 0.9 0.4 2 . 2 - 0 . 3 6.5 
Ecuador mm - •m 0 . 1 0 , 5 mm mm 0 . 6 
El Salvador M • m m - 0 . 2 0 . 3 m- <*» m 0 . 5 
Guatemala m - 0.1 mm m 0 . 2 mm 0.3 
Haiti - m - m m - m fl» m m 
Honduras -M - m m W- - mm m m 
Mexioo m m - mm 0 , 5 mm *» - 0 . 5 
Nicaragua m» m - «• - mm - m mm - mm 
Pa^ma .», M - - 0 . 1 mm « «9 mm - - 0 . 1 
•jParaguay v - m mm mm- - - - mm • 
r Perq* • .. 
.1 
V I 0 , 2 - 0 . 3 - «1 0 . 1 0.6 
dominio an. Republlo « n - • - m - «9» . m • - m-
Uruguay 2.4 0 . 3 1.1 0.3 0.4 1.7 m 0 . 1 mm - 6.3 
Venezuela m- - m- - mm 0 . 2 0 . 2 mm •• - m • 0 . 4 
Total 20 countries 0.1 0 . 1 M 0.1 M 0 j 4 - mm 0 . 8 0 . 1 2 . 2 
Bahamas 0 . 2 - • 0 . 1 . m- - m m mm - 4 » 0 . 3 
Barbados 0.3 - • 0 , 2 0 . 2 m m M m 0 . 7 
Guyana . 0 . 1 0 . 2 » « • M - mm - mm mm 0 . 3 
Jamaioa 0,2 • mm 0 . 1 m ' • *«* w m M 0 . 3 
Trinidad and Tobago ' mm ' % 0.1 m m - o u 
Total Latin America 0.1 0 . 1 2sX 0 . 1 0 £ 2 î l m m 2 & 0.1 2 . 0 
/Table 5 (concluded) 
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Argentina 0.5 m - mm - 1.2 0.1 8 . 0 
Bolivia mm 1*2 m - 0.1 mm - 1.5 
Sraall 3.4 mm m» m - - - 6«0 
Colombia m 2.4 mu - 0 . 9 m - 5.0 
Costa Rioa mm 1 . 6 0.3 mm - mm - 2.3 
Cuba mm- 2.4 2.7 mm- - m M 6.2 
Chile 0 . 8 2.4 0 . 9 3 . 0 o.l m «M I3.7 
Eouador m 2.4 - • - 0 . 1 m mm 3.1 
El Salvador m 1.7 0 . 1 mm m - mm 2«3 
Guatemala m 1 . 6 0 . 1 - m - - 2*0 
Haiti m* 8 . 1 - - m - mm 8.1 
Honduras - 1 . 8 0 . 5 m mm • m mm 2.3 
Mexleo mm 0.7 mm mm 0.4 0 . 1 - 1.7 
Nloaragua m 1.4 * • mm m- mm 1.4 
Panama mm 0.8 0.4 " m - - 10 
Paraguay - 5.6 - mm - m - • - 5.6 
Peru «m 6 . 3 mm • 0 . 9 mm •• mm 7.8 
Dominioan Republlo 1.9 0 . 2 • - - - - 2.1 
Uruguay 0*8 - 2.4 - m» - - 9.5 
Venezuela - 2.3 mm • - - - - 2.7 
Total 20 countries 0.1 2.2 M 0.1 0 . 1 -
Bahamas - - 0.3 1 . 8 m - m 2.4 
Barbados m» mm - 1.0 1 . 6 mm - m 3-3 
CrvQrana mm 2.5 m- - mm 2 , 8 
Jamaloa mm 0 . 9 1.6 0 . 7 - - - 3.5 
Trinidad and Tobago mm- 0.6 0 . 8 0 . 6 mm- «t • m 2 . 1 
Total latin America 0.1 2 . 0 M M 0.1 0 . 1 - M 
Sources: FAO, Trade Yearbook, 1973» and United Nations, International Trade Statistics, 1974» 
sj See note ¿/of table 1* 
/Table 5 
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Table 7 
VALUES, IN MILLIONS Oi? DOLLARS, OP EXPORTS AMD IMPORTS OP THE COMMODITIES 
LISTED BELOW BY THE 25 COUNTRIES CF THE REGION 
(Average 1970-1972) 
Exports Imports 
FOB CIF . 
1. Sugar i 418,4 21.4 
'S 
2. Cocoa 124.0 16.1 
3. Coffee 1 9 I 2 . I 49.7 
4. Tea . 14.5 12.3 
5. Natural rubber 9 . 7 55.1 
6. Cotton 487.9 64.0 
7 * S i s a l 2 9 . I • 0 . 6 
8. Jute 1.1. 4.0 
9 . Copper 9 6 3 . 3 . 127.0. 
10. Tin 122.1 11.2 
11. Rice 3 4 . 8 68.7 
1 2 . TfJheat 1 0 2 . 5 3 8 2 . 9 
13. Beef 668.1 55.0 
14. Wool 124,3 2 2 . 3 
15. Alumina and bauxite 306.3 3.0 
16. Iron ore 497.8 23.0 
17» Bananas 376.6 18.6 
Total 7 1 9 2 . 6 934.$ 
Total value of trade 17 047.7 18 711.8 
Percentage of total trade. . . . 
accounted for by the 
17 products . ' 42,2 5,0 
Sources: Data taken from IBRD, Coraoodlty Trade and Price Trends, 1975* and PAO, Trade Yearbook, 
1974. 
/For the 
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For the majority of the countries it is the wheat imports which are 
of some importance. It may therefore be concluded that the cost-
benefit ratio, (higher cost of some imported products and higher 
incomes from export products) would seem to operate in favour of the 
majority of the countries of the region and that the exceptions 
could be approached through special arrangements, particularly in 
the case of imports of food. 
"(f) Improvement and enlargement of compensatory financing 
facilities for the stabilization ir. real terms around a 
growing trend of export earnings of developing countries" 
The developing countries have repeated here the position they 
have held for many years to the effect that it is necessary to 
liberalize and broaden the compensatory financing facility provided 
by the. IMF. This repetition, made shortly after the Executive 
Directors of the Fund introduced some changes in the rules under 
which compensatory credits were granted, would seem to indicate that 
the developing countries find these changes inadequate and 
insufficient and are therefore inclined to see to it that UNCTAD IV 
should adopt a, series of principles and recommendations on the -V 
.ft- ' 
subject fo he submitted to the IMF for consideration. 
.The charges introduced are the following: 
- To raise the ceiling of the drawings for this reason: up 
to 50 per cent of the member country's quota in any twelve-month 
period (previously 25 per cent)* but without exceeding a total of 
75 per cent of the quota (previously 50 per cent); 
- Modification of the formula used to calculate the size of 
the export shortfall. The shortfall will continue to be calculated 
in relation to the average of the Member's export earnings for the 
five-year period centred on the shortfall year, but whereas in the 
previous formula the average earnings projected for the two years 
following the shortfall year could not be higher than 10 per cent of 
average earnings in the two years preceding the shortfall year, the 
new formula provides that: "in computing the five-year average, 
earnings in the two post shortfall years would be deemed to be equal 
/to earnings 
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to earnings in the two pre-shortfall years.multiplied by the. ratio 
of the sum of earnings in the most recent three years to that in 
the three preceding years. If the Fund considers that the result 
of the computation under the previous sentence is not reasonable, 
the Fund, in conjunction with the Member, will use an estimate based 
on a judgmental forecast".1/ The Fund proposes to review the formula 
not later thah 31 March 1977 j and the decision as a whole when 
experience and developing circumstances make this desirable, but in 
any event the Fund will review the decision whenever (i) drawings 
under this decision in any twelve-month period exceed SDR 1.5 billion 
or (ii) outstanding drawings under this decision exceed SDR. 
3.0 billion. 
The above changes certainly introduce greater flexibility in 
IMF policy with regard to compensatory financing, but do not appear 
to be sufficient to constitute a substantive change with respect to 
earlier practice in the field. The. Group of 2k stated in this 
connexion: , < 
'.'Ministers noted that the liberalization of the compensatory 
financing facility agreed to by the Executive Board feel far short 
of the expectations of the developing countries, and suggested that 
there should be an early review of the facility to: . v -
(a) provide for shortfalls to be calculated in real̂  terms; 
(b) expand the facility and extend- the repayment,period."2/ 
In addition to the two aspects mentioned in the communique of 
the Group of 2k, others should also be mentioned. Since ¡by definition 
the compensatory financing facility is designed to aid the countries 
when their export earnings fall for. reasons beyond their control, it 
seems unnecessary that they should in addition meet the requirement 
1/ Compensatory financing of exports fluctuations, Executive 
Board decision, 2k December 1975, IMF Survey, 12 January 1976» 
page 5. 
2/ Press comuniqué issued in Kingston (Jamaica) on 7 January 1976 
following the meeting of the Group of 2k. IMF Survey, 
26 January 1976, page 29. 
/of facing 
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of facing payments difficulties. In addition, this requirement of 
facing payments difficulties seems inconsistent with the other 
requirement that they should amortize the credits received in a 
relatively short period, whatever, the balance-of-payments situation 
may be. It is also not very clear what the connexion is between 
the fact that the shortfall was produced by causes beyond the member's 
control and the fact that the country in question is subject to an 
increasing amount of conditionality in the use of the credits, 
i conditionality which is manifested in the degree of acceptance by . 
the country of the policies which the Fund suggests and solutions 
to its balance-of-payments difficulties. 
It is possible that some of the changes in the IMF compensatory 
financing facility which have been discussed in recent years call 
for an amendment to the Fund's Articles of Agreement. This is 
particularly important if it is considered that the compensatory 
financing facility was fundamentally conceived to tackle the short-
term fluctuations in the export earnings of the developing countries. 
During the deliberations of UNCTAD I, however, more emphasis was 
placed oij the problems arising from adverse movements in export 
earnings, whose nature and duration could only be properly 
counteracted by long-term measures to support the balance of 
payments. The report of the Secretary-General to that Conference 
and its Final Declaration focused attention in particular on the 
need to provide long-term assistance through a supplementary financing 
mechanism which would enable the developing countries to avoid 
disruptions in their long-term development plans. To this end, 
recommendation A-IV-18 was adopted, which invited the World Bank 
to study the possibility of establishing a supplementary financing 
mechanism. Almost since the middle of the past decade until the 
beginning of the present one, both the World Bank and the 
Intergovernmental Group on Supplementary Financing of the UNCTAD 
/were continuously 
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were continuously involved in the discussion of proposals on this 
subject. At the beginning of the 1970s, however, it became clear 
that the proposals on supplementary financing did not have the 
support of important developed countries, and that the World Bank 
did riot consider it relevant to continue to study this subject. 
/II. THE 
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II. THE UNITED STATES GENERALIZED SYSTEM 
OF PREFERENCES 
The United States Generalized System of Preferences went into 
effect on 1 January 1976, as authorized in Title V of the Trade Act 
of 197^ and implemented through Executive Order 11888 of 2k November 
1975.1/ This order designates beneficiary countries and articles 
eligible for GSP treatment. Three Latin American countries have been 
omitted from the list of beneficiaries: Cuba, Ecuador and Venezuela, 
the first owing to the long-standing interruption of trade relations 
between that country and the United States, and the latter two 
because of their participation in OPEP agreements and practices. 
The main lines of the United States Generalized System of 
of Preferences, as included in the Trade Act of 197^, have been 
described in the Commission's study "Latin American Development and 
the International Economic Situation".2/ However, over the course 
of 1975 and the beginning of 1976 the lists of items proposed for 
inclusion in the scheme have undergone substantial modification and 
one of the purposes of including the subject of the preferences in 
j£he present document is to take these changes into account. A further 
motive for the inclusion is to emphasize the potential importance of 
the United States scheme for the Latin American countries - not only 
for their exports of manufactured goods but of primary products as 
well. It may be observed that since the Latin American area has 
already achieved a more sophisticated level of output than other 
developing regions, the preferences for manufactured products will 
be specially important to these countries. 
1/ Published in Federal Register, Volume 40, NQ 229 of 
26 November 1975 (Amended by Executive Order 11906 of 
25 February 1976). 
2/ United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, Latin 
American Development and the International Economic Situation, 
Second Regional Appraisal of the International Development 
Strategy, Part Two, pp. 87-93-
/In general 
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In general the United States system shows the result of efforts 
to make it a positive and meaningful one.which does not repeat 
certain shortcomings to be found ia similar schemes of other developed 
countries, such as the imposition of tariff quotas in the EEC's scheme. 
While recognizing that there are, from the developing countries'. 
viewpoint, certain imperfections in its own scheme, the United States 
has recommended that these, countries adopt a positive attitude and 
attempt to take caximum advantage of the opportunities it affords. 
From Latin America's viewpoint, the main flaws are fourfold, having 
to do with: (a) country coverage; (b.) product coverage; (c) the 
nature of the rules of originand (d) the operation of the competitive 
need formula. The problems arising from all four of these aspects 
have been under attack in the OAS and UNCTAD. The OAS has been 
pressing for the inclusion in the United States scheme of Ecuador 
and Venezuela, and, with respect to product coverage, has, in 
co-operation with governments prepared and pressed for inclusion of, 
an additional list of products of interest to the Latin American 
countries. Both organizations/'have Ijeen making detailed studies of 
the nature aaid probable effects of^the other two limitations mentioned. 
In UNCTAD's analysis of the ijiles of-origin they examine the practical 
significance of the-35 per cent and 50 per cent stipulations for* • 
indigenous production and point out that discrimination according 
to direct or indirect costs can effectively exclude important products 
which could otherwise be eligible for preferejices.1/ In view of the 
greater complexity and somewhat amorphous character of the fourth 
type of limitation of the scheme, it has been deemed advisable to 
devote some rather scarce space in this document to an examination of 
its possible effects for Latin America. 
1/ The analysis will not be repeated here but may be found in 
UNCTAD document TD/B/C.5/38 of 6 November 1975. "Review of 
the Schemes of Generalized Preferences of Developed Market-
Economy Countries. Scheme of Generalized Preferences of the 




With respect to eligible articles, Executive Order 11888 
distinguishes.between those listed in Annex II in respect of which 
all beneficiary countries and territories are eligible for 
preferential treatment, and a shorter list of items which are denied 
GSP treatment when imported from a specified country falling under 
the "competitive need" formula. According to this, formula preferential 
treatment is denied to an individual beneficiary country when United 
States imports in a previous year of a product from it exceeded 
25 million dollars or made up more than 50 per cent of total United States 
imports of the product. Of the beneficiaries affected for one or 
more product, sixteen are Latin American (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia., 
Costa Rica, Chile, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, El Salvador and Trinidad 
and Tobago). Several Latin American countries are among those which 
have the highest percentage of exports covered by the scheme affected 
by the competitive need formula.1/ This subject will be dealt with 
in more detail at a later point in the text. 
According to official United States information 2/ 67 per cent 
of Latin American exports to the United States in 197^ entered duty-
free. It has been calculated that had the United States GSP been in 
effect in that year the figure would have been 75 per cent, 
corresponding, in absolute terms, to approximately one billion dollars. 
In other words, if the United States GSP had been in effect in 197^, 
an additional 107 million dollars of Latin America's export to the 
United States would have entered duty-free. 
1/ It should be noted that on 25 February 1976 the United States 
revised its list of competitiva need exclusions, now that 1975 
import data have become available; moreover this type of 
revision will be repeated every year as new information on 
imports becomes available. The 25 million dollars limit will 
likewise be increased in future years in proportion to the growth 
of United States gross national product. The preceeding list of 
countries is based on the 25 February revision. 
2/ United States Department of State, United States Embassy in 
Santiago, Chile, Noticias económicas. NQ 8l. 
/The total 
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The total value of United States imports that would have been 
subject to ;.GSP in 197^ is. 25jOOO million dollars, or about one quarter 
of the total value of United States imports from the world in the 
same year. 2,720 items are now eligible for preferences,- including ' 
agricultural, primary, semi-manufactured and manufactured goods. As 
time goes by, additional items can be added to the list. 
However, the fact that total United States imports in 197^ of 
products eligible for preferences as of 1 January 1976 corresponds 
to about one quarter of all United States imports and that this 
quarter was valued at 25 billion dollars cannot be evaluated in isolation 
from other very relevant dàta. In the first place, imports of 
eligible articles from beneficiary countries accounted for only 
2.6 per cent of total United.States imports in 197^.1/ This means 
that the bulk of the United States GSP-favoured products have until 
now been traded between developed countries and in the case of those 
products where. United Stages customs duties have been high enough to 
present the main barrier to imports from developing countries, the 
new system will of course be a positive stimulus to the latter*s 
»exports. In which cases these duties have been the main barrier 
cannot be clear without detailed case by Case study;.competitive 
conditions in the world market and other factors can sometimes mean 
that a low duty of 5 or 6 per cent is enough to keep a developing 
country's product from being imported whereas in other cases barriers 
of 10 per cent or moré can be overcome. Moreover, as has been 
pointed out elsewhere, the advantage that will be taken of the GSP 
will depend, at least in part, on the ability of developing countries 
to produce with adequate quality control and tò market products 
skillfully. : 
In the second place,- the Operation of the competitive need 
formula means a sizeable reduction of the benefits that thè United 
States GSP could otherwise have for Latin America arid other 
1/ United St&tes Department of State, bureau of Public Affairs, 
Gist., February 1976". : 
/developing countries. 
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developing countries. Table 1 shows United States imports in 1973 
from designated beneficiary Latin American countries of products 
now included as eligible for the GSP. Column 1 provides these data 
as they would stand if the competitive need formula (described 
earlier) would not be applied, whereas column 2 shows the erosion 
of the preferences after application of the formula. 
It will be noted that two sets of figures have been provided 
in column 2, showing value of United States imports from Latin 
American countries covered by the GSP after application of the 
competitive need formula. The first set is based on data appearing 
in United States Executive Order ll8Mf of 2k March 1975 whereas the 
second set is based on Executive Order 11888 of 2k November 1975 
which incorporated changes resulting from public hearings to 
investigate anticipated repercussions of the United States GSP on 
the United States economy. The analysis of the hypothetical coverage 
of the system with respect to 1973 imports from Latin America was 
made by UNCTAD for all developing countries. In view of the data 
shifts occurring for many countries as a result of the hearings it 
has been considered of interest to present both sets of figures. As 
mentioned in a footnote to Table 1, a further revision made by the 
United States Government in Executive Order 11906 of 25 February 1976 
has been received too late to permit additional revision of the 
tables. This new order adds 37 new exclusions in the case of Latin 
America and removes 26«. These changes have to be examined of course 
in the light of trade values for the countries and products concerned 
in order to determine their real economic significance. 
According to this latest list of exclusions, only seven Latin 
American countries, out of a possible twenty-five, are at present 
eligible for GSP for all 2,720 items included in the United States 
scheme. These are the Bahamas,' Barbados, Bolivia, Guatemala, 
Paraguay, El Salvador and Uruguay. According to UNCTAD's analysis 
of the November list, in the case of sixteen out of twenty-two so-
called "eligible" countries, less than half of 1973 imports of 





UNITED STATES IMPORTS IN 1973 PROM DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY 
U T IN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
(Values in 15$ OOP OOP) 
Products lnoluded in the GSP Shares 
1 2 Column 2 
' Before applying 
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Argentina 121.1 6 O . 5 '53.8 38.4 44.4 63.5 
Bahamas' 17.9 17.5 17.9 ' I7.5 1 0 0 . 0 100,0 
Barbados 7.3 5.8 7.3 5.7 100.0 100.0 
Bolivia 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 lOOaO 100.0 
Brail 337.9 2 6 9 . 2 193*1 223-3 5 7 . 2 8 3 . 0 
Colombia 32.4 2 5 . 8 32.4 b/ 25,8 b/ y y 
Costa Riua 21.8 19.8 21.8 3 . 2 99.7 16.2 
Chile 77.7 , 77.5 2.6 , 41.6 3 . 3 53.7 
El Salvador 11.6 11.2 11.6 11.2 100.0 100.0 
Guatemala 15.7 ISO ' 1 5 . 7 y 1 5 . 3 y 1 0 0 . 0 y 1 0 0 . 0 y 
Guyana 7.3 7.3 7 . 3 7 . 3 100.0 100.0 
Haiti 25.3 20.8 16.1 11.6 6 3 . 5 5 6 . 0 
Honduras 10.4 10.4 9.6 9 . 7 9 2 . 6 93.1 
Jamaloa 13.7 4.0 1 3 . 6 . 3.9 9 9 . 1 9 7 . 6 
Mexico 1 0 7 6 . 5 6 6 0 . 5 429.7 462.4 3 9 . 9 7 0 . 0 
Nloaragua 14.3 1 3 . 8 14.3 1 3 . 8 9 9 . 8 9 9 . 7 
Panama 11.5 11.3 11.5 , 11.3 100.0' 100.0 
Paraguay 13.9 7.6 13.6 7.6 9 7 . 5 . 100.0 
Peru 188.2 I 8 8 . 0 30.3 1 8 8 . O 1 6 a ' 100.0 
Dominican Re publlo : 1 6 1 . 8 1 5 8 . 2 2 3 . 0 151.5 14*2 9 6 . 0 
Trinidad and Tobago 6.9 6.4 6.2 5.7 . 9 0 , 2 8 9 . 4 
Uruguay " 7.4 5.8 7.4 5.8 100.0 100.0 
Total 0/ 2 1 8 2 . 5 1 5 9 8 . 6 y 1 262,7 y hA*/ 22iO y 
Sourcest UNCTAD derived froms Annex VI, TD/B/C.5/38 of November 1975 "Review of the schemes of generalized 
preferences of developed market-eoonsny countries. Sohemes of generalized preferences of the United 
States of Acerloa"; and TD/B/C.5/3fi/Add.T of 6 Januajy 1976, Annex II. 
a/ These figures presented In two separate oolumns, were arrived at on the basis of two different Executive 
Orders of the Wilted States. The first is Executive Order 11844 of tferoh 24, 1975, and the seoond, whioh 
superseded the first, Is Order 11888 of November 24, 1975. The differences between one column and another 
refleot the results of the Publlo Hearings in the United States to determine the anticipated effeots on 
the United States economy of implementation of the proposals of 24 tferoh. 
b/ As shown in UNCTAD documents oited above. However, Executive Order 11888 implementing the GSP shows 
Colombia excluded in the oases of TSUS 155*20 and 365,05 and Guatemala in the case of 155,20. The ,. 
25 Februaiy revision of the Order olroulated by UNCTAD in their document TD/B/373/Add. 5/Amend. 1, dated 
15 March 1976, does not, however, exclude Guatemala. This revision was.received too late to permit a 
complete modification of tables 1 and 2. '„ . 
0/ Dlsorepanoles in addition are due to rounding.. ,. 
/In the 
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In the third place, if account is taken of the fact that three 
Latin American countries (Cuba, Ecuador and Venezuela), are for the 
present at least, excluded from preferences on all 2,720 TSUS items, 
then the erosion of the scheme through the application of the 
competitive need formula is even more significant for the region as 
a whole. 
Table 2 has been prepared to show the relationship between 
dutiable imports and total imports of the United States from the 
Latin American countries as well as the portion of all dutiable 
imports made up by those effectively covered by the GSP. In the case 
of only ten countries did dutiable imports covered by effective 
preferences make up more than 32 per cent of all dutiable imports. 
In the case of only seven countries was the ratio of dutiable imports 
to total imports less than per cent. Without going into the 
question of levels of duties in the present analysis, the table, 
based on UNCTAD's figures, would indicate that a very significant 
portion of Latin America's exports to the United States is still 
subject to customs duties. 
The Secretariat of the Organization of American States has 
published a list 1/ of additional products of interest to Latin 
American countries for inclusion under the United States GSP, and has 
indicated those whose exclusion is not mandatory under the terms of 
The Trade Reform Act of 197^. Inclusion of such items in the scheme 
would mean considerable progress in extending the coverage of its 
benefits for Latin America, but this inclusion would not be a 
satisfactory substitute for benefits eroded through the competitive 
need formula. 
1/ OAS/Ser.H/XIII, CIES/CECON-COMERC10/95, 16 January 1976, 
"Lista adicional de productos de América Latina: identifi-
cación de las partidas arancelarias de acuerdo a disposiciones 
de la Ley de Comercio Exterior de Estados Unidos sobre productos 
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Argentina 259.6 221.7 53.8 38.4 '85.4 24.3 17.3 
Bahamas 273.5 245.2 17.9 17.5 89.7 7-3 7.2 
Barbados 11.3 10.6 7.3 5.8 94.1 6 9 . 2 54.2 
Bolivia 33.9 6.7 ' 1.9 1.9 19.8 2 9 . O 2 8 . 5 
Brazil 1 142.9 530.3 193.1 2 2 3 . 3 46.4 36.4 42.1 
Colombia 393.7 8 8 . 3 32.4 0/ 25.8 0/ 22.4 36.7 0/ 2 9 . 2 0/ 
Costa Rloa 139.6 64.0 21.8 3.2 45.9 34.0 5 . 0 
Chile 102.3 8 2 . 9 2.6 41.6 8 1 . 0 3.1 5 0 . 2 
El Salvador 117.7 2 6 . 2 11.6 11.2 2 2 . 3 44.1 42.6 
Guatemala I 6 5 . 8 47.3 15.7 0/ 15.3ç/ 2 8 . 6 33-1 2/ 32.3 2/ 
Guyana 44.6 7-5 7.3 7-3 1 6 . 9 96.5 96.4 
Haiti 6 0 . 2 41.6 16.1 1 1 . 6 6 9 . 1 3 8 . 6 27.8 
Honduras 144.2 41.5 9.6 9.7 2 8 . 8 2 3 . 8 23.3 
Jamaioa 171.1 24.2 13.6 3.9 14.1 • 5 6 . 2 16.3 
Hexioo 2 165.9 1 652.0 429.7 462.4 , 76.3 2 6 . 0 28.0 
Nloaragua 105.4 6 6 . 1 14.3 ' 13.7 6 2 . 7 2l*;6 20.8 
Panann 59.1 24.4 . 11.5 11.3 41.3 47.2 46.3 
Paraguay 19.9 15.6 13.6 7.6 78.4 86.8 49.1 
Peru 310.2 222.2 30.3 188.0 71.6 - 1 3 . 7 84.6 
Domlnioan Republlo 304.5 184.6 23.0 151.5 6 0 . 6 12.5 82.1 
Trinidad and Tobago 364.9 3 4 0 . 6 6.2 5.7 93.3 1 . 8 1.7 
Uruguay 1 2 . 3 9.3 7.4 5.8 75.3 79.8 6 2 . 5 
Total d/ 6 402.7 3 ?52.8 940.7 0/ 1 262.7 0/ 23.8 0/ 
Sources-. UNCTAD, derived froms (a) Annex VI, TD/B/C.5/38 of 6 November 1975 and(b) Annex II of TD/B/C.5/38/Add.l 
of 6 January 1976» 
a/ See Note a/ in table 1. 
b/ After exolusions due to the operation of the oompetitive need formula. 
0/ See Note b/ in table 1. 
d/ Disorepanoies in addition are due to rounding. 
/At the 
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At the Sixth Ordinary Meeting of the Special Commission on 
Consultation and Negotiation of CIES, which took place in Washington 
D.C. in February 1976, the Latin American countries expressed their 
concern that as a result of the confidential nature of the objections 
presented at the Public Hearings of the United States International 
Trade Commission concerning the inclusion.in .the Generalized System 
of Preferences of certain products of special interest to the Latin 
American "countries, it would not be possible to continue efficiently 
the consultations and negotiations.between these countries and'the 
United States and arrive at positive results. On the other hand, the 
Meeting received with interest the offer of the United States to 
provide^ technical assistance to the developing countries in order 
that they might take full advantage of the system once it would go 
into effect. Two subjects of considerable importance to the Latin 
American countries are reflected in formal declarations made at the 
meeting: In the. first, the Latin American countries call on the 
Government of the United States to adopt measures leading to approval 
of draft amendments to the Trade Act of 197^ in order to permit the 
inclusion of Ecuador and Venezuela in the list of beneficiary 
countries.!/ The second declaration, which appeared in Annex II of 
the document just cited called on that country to take into account 
the interest shown by Latin America and 'indicated in the lists of 
products presented to the meetings of the Ad Hoc Trade Group in 
.Guatemala and Washington D.C. and which was ratified in the 
declaration in its totality. (This is the list of additional products 
•referred to earlier in the present text.) 
1/ OEA, CIES, OEA/Ser.H/XIII, CIES/CËCON/229 Rev. 1 of 
13 February 1976. Annex I. "Informe de Secretaría a la 
VI Reunión Ordinaria de la Comisión Especial de Consulta 
y Negociación". 
/III. THE 
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III. THE EXTERN AL :> DEBT OF LATIN AMERICA 
1. Present situation and^prospects of external financing 
The external financing needs of Latin America have become 
more acute recently, as a result of a greater deficit in the 
current account of its balànce óf payments. In fact, during the 
biennium 197^-1975 the countries of the region experienced a 
marked deterioration in their current account, running an average 
annual deficit of 9»550 million dollars, compared with the period 
1970-1973» in'which the annual average wàs 4,000 million dollars; 
in other words, the situation in the current account worsened 
in the period under consideration, the deficit being almost two 
and a half times higher. 
The situation of the non-oil-exporting Latin American 
countries was even worse, for their deficit ròse from an average 
of 3»750 million dollars on current account, in the period 
1970-1973» to one of 14,750 million dollars as an average for 
the biennium 1974-1975; in other words the deficit mentioned 
quadrupled. 
The situation just described, with all that it implies, is 
due to the increase in import prices for capital and intermediate 
goods, the increase in oil prices, the effects of the recession 
in the industrial world which affected both the volume and the 
prices of important export products of the region, and the increase 
in the payment of the servicing of foreign capital. 
It seems necessary to mention that the deficit mentioned 
above occurred in spite of the fact that in 1975 the majority of 
the non-oil-exporting countries of the region reduced their imports 
in real terms, and furthermore suffered à drop in the growth rate 
of the GDi? which fell to 2.2 per cent, since the rate for the 
period 1970-1974 was 6.9 per cent. 
/In addition 
:Li, if'6 .3. 
In addition to the foregoing, it ought to be,pointed out that 
several non-oil-exporting countries borrowed large sums in 197^ and 
1975 to cushion the effect of the deficit on imports and domestic 
growth. These loans were largely obtained in the market, and were 
characterized by periods of maturity which were" shorter and costs 
which were much higher than those obtained for official bilateral 
and multilateral flows, which made their debt' servicing particularly 
onerous for the immediate future. 
For 1976, according to the estimates of the international 
financial institutions, it is expected that the non-oil-exporting 
Latin American countries will have a deficit on current account . 
lower than that of 1975, by'some 2,000 to 3,000 million dollars, 
in other words, a deficit in the region of 12,200 to 13,200 million 
dollars is expected. The smaller deficit expected for 1976 is 
mainly the result of the reactivation of exports (in volume and 
value) because of the anticipated cyclical recovery in the 
industrial countries. Moreover, it is felt that several countries 
of the rejgion, either because of inflationary problems, the level 
of reserves, high external indebtedness and/or restricted capacity 
for obtaining loans will be handicapped in their attempts to 
increase their imports in an effort to recover and to accelerate 
their rate of economic growth. 
It should not be forgotten that unless there is a substantial 
recovery in the value of exports, the drop in the deficit estimated 
for the Current Account of the non-oil-exporting countries of the 
region will depend on a lower volume of imports (as a result of 
exchange, income, fiBcal, and monetary policies» or restrictions in 
the use of, or access to external finance and/or reserves) and as a 
result on a reduction in the level of economic activity and/or 
employment, with the resulting decline in the rate of economic 
growth. That is to say, that the deficit will increase if the 
countries try to maintain or accelerate their rate of development. 
Moreover, it seems important to mention that, in spite of the 
/reduction planned, 
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reduction planned, the deficit on current account of the Latin 
American countries mentioned, is expected to be, as in 1974 and 
1975» the highest of-all the non-oil-producing developing regions 
(Africa, Asia, Latin America and-the - Caribbean, and the Middle 
East). 
As a result, although prospects for 1976 point to a smaller 
deficit than that recorded in 1975« it should be borne in mind 
that such a result can be achieved to some extent at the cost of 
reduced economic growth and, in addition, that a deficit of the 
size mentioned, for the third consecutive year, requires a 
continued substantial net flow of resources, particularly in view 
of the growth of the external debt of the countries of the 
region, the change in its composition, the terms under which 
they were obtained and the drop in the level of international 
reserves. .The external financing of Latin America at levels 
(and under terms) which are "necessary" (as a suitable complement 
for both the formation of regional capital and the efforts 
needed to solve, balance-rof-payments problem) is ode of the most 
important and pressing problems facing the.region.; 
2. The excessive external debt 
The level and rate of growth of the publicly guaranteed 
external public and private debt of the countries of the region 
are very high and involve a high annual outlay of foreign 
exchange. In fact, as table 1 shows, at the end of 1975» the 
debt amounted to 25,900 million dollars and in recent year its 
rate of growth doubled that of the 1960s. 
/Table 1 
Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: PUBLICLY GUARANTEED PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE EXTERNAL -DEBT a/ ';• 
(Millions of dollars) . 
I960 1965 ,, , 1970 1971 1972 1922. 
Total Latin America 5 800 9 276 15 842. 18 150 21 520 25 897 
Non-oil exporting 
countries 5 295 8 649. 14 382 16 323 . 19 165 23 400 











Total Latin America M 14.6 ; 18.6 . , 20.3 mm^-mmrnBm 
Non-oil exporting 
countries 
• ; j-< 
10.3 10.7 .. .• 13.5 
,. ' <v 
17.4 22.1 
Source : World Bank, World Debt: Tables E. C. - 167775 , 31.X.75-
Note : Latin America-including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, • 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay ,and 
Venezuela. 
The oil^exporting countries of the region include Bolivia, 
Ecuador,1 Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. 
a/ Undisbursed. • ••".•• : ;.;• 
/The balance-
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The balance-of-payments" situation for 1974 and 1975 suggests 
that these figures have been largely exceeded. Preliminary estimates 
for 1974 (on the basis of information on some non-oil exporting 
countries of the region, which since 1970 account for a more or less 
fixed percentage of the debt of all the non-oil-exporting countries 
of the region) show that these latin American countries would have 
increased their net official and private publicly guaranteed debt 
by approximately 8,000 million dollars as a result of which the 
debit balance for this type of debt at that date would be 
approximately 32,000 million dollars. The rate of growth of the 
net debt of these countries of the region in 1974 is probably 
around 37 per cent, a figure almost 4 times higher than the 
average annual growth rate of the debt in the previous decade, 
and more than double that of the average growth rate in the 
period 1970-1973» It should be noted that the estimate just 
given did not include information on Brazil nor Argentina, 
countries (particularly the first) for which there are no 
preliminary figures for supporting these projections. 
It is important to note that the external debt table is 
over simplified when speaking of Latin America as a whole, for 
the situation in the different countries is highly varied. 
Towards the end of 1973, the bulk of the official and publicly 
guaranteed debt of the region (75 per cent) was concentrated in 
five countries: Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile and Colombia, 
all of them non-oil-exporting countries, but with marked differences 
as regards access to international capital markets, the flow of 
direct foreign investment, availability of international reserves, 
external trade possibilities, stability in economic policies, 
growth and diversification of the export sector, etc. 
/In addition 
. In addition to.the problems raised, it is important to 
pointrout that the evolution of the external debt structure of 
Latin. Ameiica is unfavourable. In, fact,: as can be seèn,in table 2 
the official bilateral debt has been falling (as a percèntage) 
systematically in recent years, for in 1976 it amounted to 39,per 
cent of a total of the Latin American debt, whereas in 1973 it 
amounted to only 26 per cent. Similarly, whereas the total of 
the publicly guaranteed debt increased during that period by 
140 per cent, that from the private sector (also publicly 
guaranteed) increased by 200 per cent, and; bank loans: increased 
at a rate of 570 per cent. The latter which represented 9 per 
cent of the total debt towards the end of* ¿1967, exceeded 25 per 
cent in 1973. : ; " '•' •:• 
It is interesting to note, in ¡addition;.to the level, gtowth, 
and structure of the, debt, the relative Situation of'its servicing. 
As can be seen in table 3» for:the non-oil-exporting; countries 
of the region the annual cost in the servicing of the external 
private public debt publicly guaranteed was in the region of 
3,800 million dollars in 1973« There is a marked increase- in 
payments in this connexion compared with figures for the years 
1970-1972, for they are almost three times higher than the annual 
disbursement,.for.; the 1960s. 
This debt servicing has been increasing systematically and 
rapidly showing a rate of 35 per cent between the years 1972-1973-
For 1974, debt service estimates, on the basis of preliminary 
figures for the countries mentioned previously, show an annual 
disbursement approximately 12 per cent higher than that for the 
year 1973* 
The discrepancy between the high volume estimate and the 
increased growth of the debt and the possible decrease in it6 
servicing seems to be due, in addition, to the scanty information 
which served as the basis of these projections, the fact that a 
substantial part of the debt in 1974 was short-term and/or 
compensatory in nature, as a result of which its servicing was not 




LATIN AMERICA: EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT OUTSTANDING a/ 
BY TYPE OF CREDITOR AT THE END OF THE YEAR 
(Millions of dollars) 
• 1967 1970 1973 
Bilateral official 5 800 6 737 9 362 
Multilateral 3 298 5 028 8 394 
Private • 5 9 0?1 17 649 
Suppliers 2 574 3 938 4 708 
Banks 1 378 2 460 9 167 
Others 2 012 2 693 3 774 
Total 15 061 20 856 35 4o4 
Source: World Bank, Annual Report 1975, Table 4. 




LATIN AMERICA: SERVICING OF THE. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
EXTERNAL DEBT PUBLICLY GUARANTEED a/ 
(Millions of dollars) 
- .... v.; ' I960 196? 1970 .1221 1222 1221 
Total Latin America 1 398 ] L 771 2 491 2 702' ' 3 051 k 116 
Non-oil exporting 
2 786 3 762 countries 1 260 1 687 2 355 2 515 
I960- 1965- 1970- 1971- 1972-
Rates of growth: 1265 1970 1?71 1?72 197? 
Total Latin America its2 - ĴlanL' M 13 .Q 
Non-oil exporting 
6.0 6.7 10.9 countries 6.9 0 




It should be noted that the figures and projections 
considered so far do not include the private debt which was not 
publicly guaranteed (regardless of maturity dates), nor the 
compensatory debt, nor loans for less than one year. It appears 
worthwhile to provide some information which shows the degree to 
which the results are underestimated from taking account of only 
the public and private debt publicly guaranteed. 
In table 4 it can be seen that in 1973 the non-oil-exporting 
countries of the region paid 6,900 million dollars in debt 
servicing, in other words 80 per cent more than the value of 
servicing the public debt officially guaranteed. Note that this 
table does not include either compensatory nor short-term debt 
retirement with the result that the "total" debt servicing in that 
year was at least double that indicated in table 3. 
In studying trends in the debt servicing ratio as regards 
the balance-of-payments and restricting it tq official servicing 
(or publicly guaranteed servicing), it can be seen that from 1970 
to 1973 the margins by which the latter was underestimated were 
increasing. In fact, as table 4 shows, in 1970 the "effective" 
debt servicing of non-oil-exporting Latin American countries was 
45 per cent higher than that under official commitments, a figure 
which has been increasing systematically, the difference being 82 per 
cent in 1973. In view of the greater indebtedness towards the 
private sector in 1974-1975, the International Monetary Fund, and 
the short-term debt in general incurred by these countries over 
the last two years, it does not seem exaggerated to argue that 
current debt servicing is more than double that which can be 
deduced from the publicly guaranteed debt only. 
As a result, the situation of Latin American external debt 
and its future projections, particularly as a result of the change 
in sources of finance in recent times, is worse than appears from 




• : ¡Table 4 • < 
LATIN AMERICA: EXTERNAL DEBT SERVICING ON THE BASIS OF 
BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS DATA AND ANNUAL GROWTH RATES 
(Millions Of dollars) 
Total Latin America a/ 
Non-oil exporting 
countries 
Rates of growth: 
Total Latin America 
Non-oil exporting 
countries 
Source: ECLA on the basis of IMF data.. Balance of Payments Yearbook, 
a/ Includes Barbados and Haiti. 
I960 1965 1970 1971 1972 1973 197** 
1 264 1 950 3 569 4 100 5 075 7 213 8 643 
1 010 ,1 881 3 410 3 873 4 811 6 851 8 075 
I960- 1965- 1970- 1971- 1972- 1973-
1965 . 1222 Ü 7 1 1222 1221 12ZÌ 
9.1 12*8 14.9 23-8 42.1 19.8 
.13.2 12.6 13.6 24.2 42.4 ,17.9 
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3. Need for additional external financing; new sources 
In addition to the new debts contracted by the noritroil-
exporting countries of the region and the; burden of their 
servicing, there are other elements which tend to impair the 
access of Latin American countries to international financing, in 
the amount and under the terms needed if their prospects, both 
conjunctural and long-term, for sustained economic development 
are not to be seriously limited. 
First, for the first time in recent years, the non-oil-
exporting Latin American countries had to weaken their international 
reserves position in 1974 in order to finance the enormous deficit 
mentioned earlier. A similar situation occurred in 1975» though 
r 
to a greater degree, with a drop in reserve holdings of approximately 
2,000 million dollars, amounting to a total drop for the biennium 
of 2,800 million dollars. While the level of reserves was dropping, 
imports were increasing, and the reserves - value ratio of imports 
of goods dropped from a level of 60 per cent in 1973 to 33 per 
cent in 1974, and amounted to only 26 per cent in 1975« 
Similarly, the non-oil-exporting countries of the region 
have been increasing their debt with the International Monetary 
Fund recently. In fact, the bulk of this type of debt was 
accumulated in 1974 and 1975? in particular, total net drawings 
with IMF amounted to 1,300 million dollars as at 31 January 1976; 
of the net drawings accumulated at January,1975 more than 50 per 
cent was transferred over the last twelve months. 
Another factor which probably points towards the growing 
need for external- finance by the non-oil-exporting countries of 
the region is the increase in loans contracted by Latin America 
in the Euromoney market. As can be seen from table 5» the credits 
in Eurodollars declared by the countries mentioned earlier-
increased from 428 million dollars in 1971 to 5,314 million dollars 
in 1975 a figure which represents more than 60 per cent of the 
total ¡credits declared in Eurodollars granted to all the non-oil-
exporting developing countries. 
/Table 5 
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Table.5 
LATIN AMERICA: CREDITS IN EURODOLLARS 
DECLARED BY COUNTRIES 
(Millions of dollars) 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Oil-exporting countries 78 -259 107•"••' 132 350 
Non-oil exporting 
countries 428 1 607 3 70.8 4 421 . 5 313 
Argentina 50 244 87 559 J 34 
Brazil 212 , 577 , -71.8;-- 1 668 2 069 
Colombia 90 170 8 100 
Costa Rica - - 11 10 46 
Mexico 140 490 • 1 572 1 478 2 159 
Nicaragua 10 15 92 • /.;-. 51 55 
Panama 16 40 251 • 101 125 
Peru - 147, 734 . 3 6 6 . , 4 2 3 
Dominican Republic - 4 .15 20 -
Uruguay , . - _ _ . • , - ,.. r ' 130 
El Salvador. " • " :. 5Q • 45 
Guyana ~ . . ?-2. '.• ' 15' ; 24 
Jamaica - - . 36 95 103 
Haiti - - 10 -
Total Latin America 506 1,866 . 3 815 4 553 1 5 663 
Total non-oil exporting 
developing countries 1 043 2 8l8 : 6 253 8 957 8 298 
_ . „7, ' " ' — 
Source: OECD,, development Co-operation, Review 1975, p. 245« IMF, 
Survey, 23 February 1976. 
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Furthermore, it was shown in the table mentioned, that the 
number of non-oil-exporting countries,, of. the region which had 
contracted debts in Eurodollars in the, private capital market • 
increased from 5 in 1971 to 13 in 1975i although it ought to be 
pointed out that Brazil and Mexico received almost 3/4 of the 
total of credits granted to those countries of the region. 
Similarly, Argentina which appears with a relatively small debt, 
is the country which received most of the credits granted by IMF 
to those countries already mentioned. 
• Borrowings in the market in general, and ,in the Euromoney , 
market in articular, are the most costly and risky components of 
the principal sources of capital of Latin American countries, and 
the maturity dates of the resulting.debt are usually medium-term, 
compared with the longer maturity and grace periods characteristic 
of bilateral and multilateral official flows. In the case of, 
credits in Eurodollars, for the developing countries the percentage 
of operations with maturity periods between 1 and 6 years increased 
from 18 per cent in 1974 to more than.75 per,cent towards the end 
of 1975» whereas those contracted for more than 7 years dropped, 
in the same period, from 76 to only 20 per cent of the total of 
these operations in the last quarter of 1975« 
Furthermore, these ,loans (market) not only have a shorter., 
maturity period but also bear the highest costs of the funds 
obtained in international credit.markets, since they have no 
concessional element. Moreover, during ,1975 the interest rate 
margins increased on loans in Eurodollars in Latin American 
countries, compared with those in force towards the end of 1974. 
As a result, although some,of the countries of the region r 
could .resort to this relatively new form of financing, the 
maturity period and the cost of these funds are largely responsible 
for increasing the debt servicing burden. . . .. 
/4„ Latin 
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4. Latin America and international financing 
It seems desirable to stress some considerations which tend to 
show a degree of discrimination as regards the Latin American 
countries in general, and the non-oil-exporting Latin American 
countries in particular, compared with the remaining developing 
countries. 
As table 6 shows, the conditions under which loans have been 
granted to Latin America compared with those offered to other 
geographic regions have been deteriorating both in terms of maturity 
and grace periods as well as in terms of interest rates and, as a 
result, in terms of their concessional element. 
From the point of view of the structure of external debt, 
Latin America in 1973, 'compared with other geographic regions, liad an 
official bilateral debt which amounted to 26 per cent of its 
indebtedness, whereas for the rest of the world this percentage was 
56 per c^nt. Similarly, the debt contracted in the foreign private 
sector by Latin America represented more than 50 per cent of its 
total debt, whereas for other regions this debt did not exceed 
25 per cent. 
As regards trends in Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
directed towards Latin America, neither did this show any favourable 
tendency. In fact, of the total of net flows from the member 
countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), including 
both bilateral and multilateral direct investment, Latin American 
countries saw the ODA flows fall systematically from 17 per cent in 
1971 to only 10 per cent in 1974. On the other hand, the other 
developing countries not only maintained the ODA ratio to the 
remainder of external net financing from the same source stable, but, 
in addition, ODA represents approximately 50 per cent of total 
resources from DAC member countries. 
Most of the concessional credits and other official flows tend 
to be channelled towards the least developed countries, a category 
into which very few Latin American countries fall. The criterion 
/Table 6 
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•> - Table 6 














196? ,1973, 1967 1973 ,. 1967 1973 1967 1973 
13.8 13.8 4.3 4.2 5.6 8.2 26 
18.3 22.6 4.2 5.8 ,.3,4 4.5 . 43 




Source: World Bank, Annual Report, 1975• 
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applied is that of taking per capita income as an indicator of 
well-being and, as a result, its level represents, inversely, the need 
for external aid in the development effort. Although the foregoing 
seems valid, no less so is the criterion of balance-of-payments 
difficulties, which are more characteristic of the continent 
(particularly among the non-oil-exporting countries), and which 
requires in order to achieve equilibrium, a high sacrifice in terms 
of the level of economic activity. Moreover, of the information 
provided in the previous paragraphs concerning the geographical 
distribution of all the ODA loans, what has just been said aims at 
showing that Latin America and the Caribbean received, on average, 
31.5 per cent of the loans of the World Bank Group between 1964 and 
1968, 27®8 per cent between 1969 and 1973» and somewhat less than 
21 per cent 1/ in 1975-
5« The .effects, of world inflation 
There is an additional element which tends to strengthen the 
impression that difficult times lie ahead for the region's external 
sector. As a result of world inflation in recent years, nominal 
market interest rates rose during 1975» and particularly 1974, far 
above former levels.2/ The debt from private sources and multilateral 
institutions which obtain funds in the international financial market 
has also been incurred at high interest rates, precisely in the years 
1973 and 1974 (in which the rate of growth of the public and private 
external debt publicly guaranteed was 22 per cent - 1973 - and it is 
estimated at approximately 35 per cent for 1974) therefore, as the 
world economy becomes stabilized and the rates of interest return to 
"normal" levels, those international loans which were contracted at 
fixed nominal interest rates would make debt servicing over the years 
ahead particularly onerous.3/ , , 
1/ Source; World Bank, Annual Report 1.9.7.5, P° 13« 
2/ In fact, the rate of interest of the London Eurodollar 
(three-month deposits), which during the period 1970-1972 on 
average 6.85 per cent, rose in 1973 to 9-24 per cent, and in 
1974 to an average of approximately 11 per cent. 
3/ In 1975 the rate of interest described in footnote 2/ dropped to 
7 per cent, and already in January 1976 was, in the region, of 
5®5 per cent. 
/An argument 
- 61 -. 
An argument which .is .frequently used in international circles, 
and in particular in the industrialized countries is that, owing to 
world inflation the real value of the external debt of the countries 
would fall, so that, in fact they would be receiving greater aid-
through this subsidy than would haye been granted by the creditor, 
countries. 
It seems important that some reservations, should be made.as 
regards the preceding argument,.for, although it is .true that the 
flow of resources from the debtor countries falls in real terms for 
the creditor, what is of genuine importance.to the debtor is the 
cost in terms of the use of his own resources which debt servicing 
implies. In this respect, the trend in the terms of trade is of 
fundamental importance. If the export, and import prices of the 
debtor country change in line with the-world inflation rate, there 
is no doubt that such a country would benefit from having its debt 
fixed in nominal terms. If the terms of trade are favourable to 
that country, debt servicing would mean that a smaller portion of,, 
real resources than that required in the previous case would be used. 
However, if the terms of trade deteriorate, this would have 
the opposite effect to that of world inflation on the debt, there 
being a "critical" deterioration in which the debtor country neither 
gains nor looses as a result of the effect of international inflation 
on the real value (in terms of its own resources which are used for 
paying the debt) of its indebtedness. If thè terms of' trade fall 
below the "critical" level, the net effect of world inflation 
(changes in price levels) and of the change in the terms of trade -
(changes in relative ̂ price's) becomes negative, with the result that 
.the debtor country must use more ot its real resources to service the 
debt than those that would have been used if there had been no 
inflation nor any change in the relationship between export and 
import prices. . ..,. _„ 
"' ' ' : .... ' /As a 
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As a result, international inflation does not always favour 
the debtor countries, and it is necessary, in each particular case, 
to study the movement in the terms of trade, and to compare its 
evolution with that of the increases in international prices.!/ 
Thus for example, in 1975, the terms of trade for non-oil-exporting 
Latin American countries deteriorated, compared with 1974, by more 
than 10 per cent. Therefore, in real terms debt servicing does not 
seem to have decreased for these countries since world inflation 
showed a similar rate in that year. 
It ought to be mentioned that even without considering the 
limitations to which attention has just been drawn, there is a 
tendency to over-estimate the subsidy that the creditor countries 
are granting to the debtor countries, owing to the fact that world 
inflation also affects the "real" value of the international reserves 
of the latter countries. Most of these assets are made up of 
financial documents issued by the principal creditor countries, 
practically without any cost to themselves, and which (although they 
give a positive nominal yield) do not provide a yield commensurate 
with the value of the real resources provided by the debtor countries 
in exchange for the accumulation of these reserves. 
6. Some additional problems of external financing 
It seems important to mention some of the shortcomings of the 
considerations which to some extent condition the capacity of access 
to international financing sources for developing countries and, 
particularly, as in the case of most Latin American countries, those 
countries which are predominantly mono-exporters, with the resulting 
instability in prices and fluctuations in exports. 
1/ Mention should also be made of the effect already mentioned 
of world inflation on market interest rates, and the effects 
of these on the servicing of the debt conti-acted during the 
inflationary period. 
/First, attention 
First, attention should be drawn to the possible magnifying 
effect of the current account balance and/or the situation of 
international reserves on the movement of private capital. 
There seems to exist some; evidence that when a country 
experiences a deficit on current account and/or a drop in the level 
of its reserves, because of the uncertainty, as regards its policy 
measures (particularly in -respect of the exchange market), that -
these movements generate,, this is magnified through the flight of 
capital, with the result that the situation of the country becomes 
worse, and there is "even greater need to have recourse to external 
financing. However, siich financing becomes much -more difficult 
precisely because of the type of indicators traditionally used in 
the analysis of creditworthiness, which include the type and size 
> 
of the balance on the current account of the balance of payments of 
the country and/or its movement of reserves. 
This situation is particularly noticeable in a large number of 
Latin American countries, particularly those with"undeveloped 
financial and exchange structures. As a result, it is necessary to 
reexaminé the concept' of creditwbrthiii&ss and to link it with' 
elements which'genuinely determiné the,capacity of a country to pay, 
so that at least it:is not associated inversely with financing needs. 
Furthermore, it .is of interest, to note the ,evolution of, the , 
debt servicing coefficient "as regards the exports of goods and 
non-factor services,,which is one of, the indicators usually Used by 
international agencies and possible creditors to .assess ."debt 
servicing capacity" and to draw attention to its many limitations. 
Table 7 gives this information with the two concepts of debt 
servicing mentioned above. It can be seen that this coefficient, 
if only the official servicing or publicly guaranteed servicing 
for non-oil-exporting countries of the region is taken, has 
remained very stable in recent years around 16-17 per cent. If both 
guaranteed and non-guaranteed debt servicing are taken into account, 
for the medium- and long-term (excluding both compensatory and 
short-term funds), this coefficient rises, substantially, to a level 
of 28 per cent in 1973, in other words, a figure ho per cent higher 
than the indicator traditionally used. /Table 7 
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LATIN AMERICA: 
Table 7 
RATIO OF DEBT SERVICING TO EXPORTS OF 
GOODS AND SERVICES 
(Percentages) 
Coefficients on the 
basis of IBRD and 
IDB data a/ 
Coefficient resulting from 
balance-of-payments data b/ 
Non-oil 
exporting Total Non-oil exporting Total 
1965 17 13 19 15 
1970 ' 16 13 23 19 
1971 17 14 26 21 
1972 16 13 27 22 
1973 16 13 28 23 
1974c/ - - 25 17 
Source: World Bank, op.cit.; ECLA, on the basis of IMF data, 
Balance of Payments Yearbook. 
a/ Debt servicing refers to the guaranteed debt. 
b/ The servicing of the external debt of the balance of payments 
includes both the guaranteed and non-guaranteed debt for the 
use of non-compensatory foreign medium- and long-term funds 
(it does not include compensatory funds nor short-term funds). 
c/ Preliminary figures. 
/The main 
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The aâinv advantages -of this- indicator lie in the facility-it 
offers both for calculating and interpreting such calculations, for 
it reflects a fixed short-term element of the debtor country and the 
pressure to, Vihich it -would be subject if there was a sharp decline in 
the value of its exports or an increase in the value of imports. In 
particular, the higher the debt servicing-export ratio, the greater 
the fluctuation in the net. importing capacity as regards changes in 
the value of exports. 
Howeverthe coefficient mentioned, has several limitations, 
particularly that of being considered an important element in the 
analysis of creditworthiness. 
First, there is no critical limit for this indicator, on the 
basis of which it can be said that the debt cannot be serviced; in 
the past, countries,with relatively low coefficient values were 
unable to service their debt, whereas others with very high levels 
had no problems in this respect. . 
'A further limitation lies in the fact that the coefficient . 
refers to a specific: year and takes no account of the future ; 
evolution of the balance of payments; there may occur, in. particular, 
a sharp accumulation of payments in the immediate future, or changes 
in exchange or monetary.-.policy, for example, which could, provoke 
sudden "jumps" in the value of the indicator. Consequently, .the 
analysis' of the debt problem in.the long-term context serves little 
purpose. 
Furthermore., the numerator of the coefficient. includes, both 
amortization and interest payments, and thus does not take into 
account the difference between the two, from the standpoint of the 
degree of implicit rigidity, in relation to the facility of 
refinancing or simply renewing credits. 
From : the point of view of a debtor country, if its.exports 
have a high value,, the indicator :will probably not reveal the . 
existence of "problems". Nevertheless, if the country in question 
/is poor, 
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is pbor, debt service may imply great restrictions to capital 
formation and/or impose limitations on the proper functioning of 
the fiscal sector. 
One of the most important aspects to be borne in mind is that 
what is of real interest is the economy's possibility of adjusting 
to sharp and significant changes in its external situation, rather 
than the absolute level of the coefficient. The growth and dynamism 
of exports play a fundamental role in this respect. For example, if 
the non-oil-exporting countries of Latin America increase their 
(1973) exports by 10 per cent and devote 50 per cent of the increase 
to servicing the debt (official and officially guaranteed), the 
situation would be that debt service would increase by 32 per cent. 
Finally, it seems necessary to point out that from the 
standpoint of the analysis of creditworthiness, given that what the 
creditor is most interested in is the future capacity to pay the 
debt, it is more important to centre attention on assessing projected 
economic policies (rather than on the coefficient) and particularly 
on the policies related to the dynamism of exports and the entry of 
capital flows from the exterior. 
7« Final remarks 
In view of the characteristics of. the export sector of the 
majority of the countries of the region and the great change in the 
value of exports, both with regard to their regularity and their 
dynamism, it is necessary to stress the urgent need to implement 
the measures proposed by UNCTAD regarding the integrated programme 
for commodities, fundamentally aimed at a greater stabilization of 
prices and incomes from commodity exports. One of the most important 
elements of a solution to the problem of medium- and long-term 
financing is to adjust the domestic economic policies of the debtor 
countries so as to accelerate their rate of growth and particularly 
the growth and diversification of exports. To this end it is 
/necessary to 
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necessary to readjust policy instruments and use them differently 
than in the past. Thiirl^.j^ti'd^arly'-'.true' 'of'"foreign exchange, 
tariff, trade and international reserves policies, and of policies 
to subisidize non-traditional exports. 
The economic situation in recent years, however, has been 
such that to handle more efficiently the various economic policies 
will not be enough to solve the problem of external financing for 
Latin America, due to the origin of the problem, the magnitudes 
involved, the drastic reduction in the "degrees of liberty" available 
and the high cost, in terms of the economic growth rate and changes 
in the structure and level of activity and employment, entailed by 
the exclusive use of this machinery. As a result, Latin America 
needs a degree of international financial co-operation which will 
complement its own efforts aimed, in the external sector, at 
revitalizing.and diversifying its exports. 
However, it is important to stress in,connexion with the above 
that the demand situation is as important as the supply situation. 
The degree to which the industrialized economies are reactivated . 
and the extent and form in which they are protected are of great 
importance to the realization of the export potential.of the . . 
developing world in general and of Latin America in particular.. 
/External debt 
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External debt problems» Usual 
remedial machinery 
When encountering difficulties in servicing their foreign 
debt, countries have tackled them in three main ways: multilateral 
renegotiation with the principal creditors, bilateral renegotiations 
and refinancing. 
A fourth method, which has been used in times of serious and 
widespread difficulties* has been a unilateral moratorium. It 
should be recalled that a number of countries declared moratoria 
in the payment of certain external commitments during the world 
crisis of the thirties. 
Both bilateral renegotiation and refinancing are mechanisms 
which tackle only part of the problem and therefore are not 
suitable for dealing with serious foreign debt problems. They may 
perhaps in such cases be a necessary complement to multilateral 
renegotiation, but they cannot replace it. 
Thus only multilateral renegotiation, and not the other two 
mechanisms, will be studied here. 
The most serious cases of difficulties in *the servicing of 
external debt have been tackled in the postwar period fey renegotiating . 
some of the outstanding commitments with a group of important 
creditors formed specifically to deal with each case. There is no 
institution for such a purpose. 
Creditors are organized for the purposes of renegotiation 
mainly through a club of the principal creditors, meeting in one of 
the member countries, generally with a representative of the host 
country in the chair. On occasion, representatives of the World 
Bank have also presided over the group, generally when its objectives 
go beyond the mere renegotiation of the debt and include larger-scale 
assistance programmes. 
The formation of the club is brought about by the debtor 
country in question, with the support of an international organization 
(World Bank or International Monetary Fund), which normally serves as 
the technical secretariat, while it participates formally as an 
observer. 
/The chairman 
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The chairman of the club convenes the meetings- and at times 1 
acts as a mediator between debtor and creditors« Jor their part, 
the international organizations provide information to the club 
members on the debtor., its economic policies, the, amount of the 
debt and service payments, and also, undertake to supply regular 
information on the debtor's economic situation and the form in 
which it .fulfills .the undertakings it has contracted.: 
Creditor.participation in the club is voluntary at the 
beginning, but once the club has b,een. formed, there is normally 
an understanding that the debtor country will not give preferential 
treatment to any of the club members, even when one of them does 
not participate in, a specific renegotiation. This means.that the 
debtor country undertakes not to pay a creditor.which is a member 
of the club on more favourable terms to the creditor than those 
granted by the club. 
It has normally been understood that this provision does not.;.? 
apply to creditor developing countries. 
In the course of the renegotiation, decisions are taken by 
consensus and.a formal statement of the agreements adopted is 
drawn up. . , 
Multilateral agreements provide a general framework within 
which subsequent bilateral negotiations take place. This general . 
framework includes a definition of the rescheduled maturities; 
the grace period,, if there is one; the down payment and the pay-back 
period for the balance. On occasion, the rate of interest may also 
be fixed in the multilateral agreement, although sometimes it is 
left to subsequent bilateral negotiations with each creditor. 
Exactly which maturities are to be rescheduled is also left to 
detailed bilateral discussions» 
In a few cases there has been.some flexibility for bilateral 
agreements between the debtor and its creditors on interest, grace 
/period and 
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period and pay-back period, but at the same time a concessionary 
minimum has been stipulated» 1/ • , 
The debts which are renegotiated multilaterally range, 
according to the case, from all maturities of debts of over one 
year, to maturities of loans contracted before a given date 
granted ,by official institutions or guaranteed by them, for loans 
granted originally for periods of less than 40 years. In some 
cases maturities for debts which have previously been rescheduled 
are excluded from the renegotiations. In some cases, the original 
debt periods of loans whose maturity is renegotiated have been 
limited to medium-term ones, from 1 to 12 years. Often the most 
important maturities not included in the multilateral renegotiation 
are renegotiated bilaterally. 
The agreements also contain a general definition of the 
economic policy intentions of the debtor, particularly in those 
fields which may affect its capacity to service its debt in the 
future. These intentions may include stand-by arrangements with 
the IMF, restrictions on fresh foreign borrowing, incentives to 
improve the foreign trade situation and the provision of information 
to creditors on its general economic situation and the progress 
made in carrying out its declared intentions. Normally the observer 
international institutions collaborate in the supply of information 
and the preparation of the debtor's economic policies. At the joint 
request of the debtor and the creditors, they carry out the necessary 
studies or collaborate with the debtor country to that end. 
The participating international organizations are those which 
have acquired experience in cases of multilateral renegotiation. 
It is they who normally carry out the basic surveys for the 
rescheduling, prepare the projections of future debt payments and 
of their effect on the balance of payments and suggest solutions 
to the creditors. 
2/ Defined as the relation between the current value of the 
agreed future amortization and interest payments discounted 
at a previously agreed rate of interest, and the current value 
of the payments if they had not been renegotiated. 
/The renegotiation 
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The renegotiation procedure described above may have a number 
of minor variations» In some, cases, renegotiation has taken place 
within a broader framework of economic support.to the country in 
difficulties. ;In such cases, the creditor countries, together 
with an international or regional financial body, form a consortium 
which not only carries out the renegotiation but also sees to the 
additional aid which may be necessary. 
The result of multilateral renegotiations is strongly 
affected both by the seriousness of the problem for the debtor 
country and by the nature of the relations between the debtor 
country and its principal creditors. The fact that the process 
is not institutionalized results in a considerable degree of 
politicization. ~ 
/ /A possible 
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A possible new mechanism to deal with 
foreign debt1 emergencies 
Current multilateral renegotiation procedures, which are not 
institutionalized, have been relatively efficient in dealing with 
foreign debt servicing problems which are not generalized. The 
size and widespread nature of the present problem, and the outlook 
for the near future, suggest that the multilateral renegotiation 
procedure will not work efficiently. 
In the absence of machinery to act in an-emergency, some 
countries might be forced to resort to the. undesirable procedure 
of a unilateral moratorium. While such a procedure, may solve 
the emergency, it does so at a high cost to the debtor country, 
in terms both of future capital flows and of interest rates. 
There is also a high cost to the creditor country, some of whose 
financial institutions may be affected if the unilateral moratorium 
is declared in a number of debtor countries at the same time. 
Creditors and debtors should therefore look for a procedure 
to obviate the need for a moratorium in an emergency situation. 
A procedure acceptable to both parties would have to include 
a suitable degree of conditionality in the external debt service 
relief. This conditionality would call for some type of 
international supervision. 
At the same time, however, the mechanism would have to be 
sufficiently apolitical to be acceptable to the debtor countries. 
. In addition, the latter would have to have the guarantee that the 
conditionality would be in conformity with the internationally 
accepted objectives of the transfer of real resources. 
The conditionality would probably have to. include at least 
three main aspects: reasonable limits for fresh borrowing; 
suitable domestic policies in the debtor country for it to be 
able to contribute to the international process of readjustment; 
and suitable policies in the creditor country to achieve the same 
end. In a situation of widespread payments difficulties it is 
inevitable that conditionality in respect of adjustment should 
affect both debtors and creditors. ~ 
/It should 
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It should be pointed out that when there is a generalized 
payments problem, a country's external economic creditworthiness .... 
depends on the loans it can obtain and not vice versa. In. a 
normal situation it is the credits obtainable which depend on 
thè country's creditworthiness. 
The International Monetary Fund has proven experience as 
regards both conditionally and apoliticism and international 
supervision. 
Given the size of the problem 1/ and the general 
characteristics of an acceptable solution, it seems appropriate 
to think of a special refinancing facility, institutionalized in 
whatever way is ijudgèd appropriate, to which the developing 
countries can resort. The refinancing terms could vary in the 
case of each agreement, judging on the debtor's situation. 
The special refinancing facility could be financed from 
two main sources: special contributions in. the form of loans 
by the creditor countries and resources stemming from an advance 
payment on the part of the industrialized countries. This 
advance payment would correspond to the resources which, in 
accordance with the agreement in the Interim Committee of the 
International Monetary Fund, the member countries of the Fund will 
receive as profits from the sale of part of the gold in the 
possession of the IMF; they will receive them only as the gold is 
sold, which might take some time. Naturally, this source of 
financing would require the participation of the International 
Monetary Fund. 
1/ It is not easy to estimate the needs of the developing 
countries. If it is assumed that the debt actually used 
grew by 18 per cent annually between 1973 and 1976, and 
if the service-debt ratio recorded between 1970 and 1973 
remained constant, the total debt service of the developing 
countries would amount to a little less than US$ 14,000 million. 
If the new facility is used by countries representing half 
the debt service, and if fifty per cent of the latter are 
refinanced, some US$ 3,5QO million would be needed to operate 
the new facility in relation to 1976 maturities. 
/This proposal 
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This proposal would complement those currently under study, 
such as the development insurance facility and the improvement of 
the terms of the compensatory financing facility for loss of 
export earnings. 
Besides solutions of a general nature such as that proposed, 
it seems worthwhile also to consider the possibility of regional 
collaboration to improve the creditworthiness of groups of 
countries. This collaboration could take the form of machinery 
for regional financial co-operation, including the possibility of 
mutual financiál support and of guarantees for foreign borrowing. 
Naturally, in view of the size of the problem to be tackled, 
this will never be sufficient since the granting of collective 
guarantees also affects the creditworthiness of all the guarantors. 
Extra-regional collaboration in a scheme of this kind seems 
indispensable. The creation of a financial Safety Net in Latin 
America has been proposed, to facilitate consultations among the 
member countries as well as mutual support, while opening up a 
new path for extra-regional support. 
/Table 8 
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Table 8 . 
PROFITS FROM THE RESTITUTION AND SALE OF GOLD BY THE IMF 
Restitution ' Sales 
Millions rUAXIUUD _ _ . . J l'l-L » Profit a/ . of ounces of 
Millions 
ounces Profit a/ 
Developed countries 



















Assumes a profit of.USf 80 per ounce, 
in billions of dollars. 
Figures expressed 
The decision reached at the Interim Committee of the IMF in 
August 1975 provides that the profits from the sale of one-
sixth of the Fund's gold (about 25 million ounces) will be 
for the benefit of the developing countries. 
Tsible 9 
NON-OIL EXPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: EXTERNAL 
DEBT AND DEBT SERVICE a/ 
(Millions of dollars) 
1973 1974b/ 1975b/ 1976^ 
External debt 70 792 83 535 98 571 116 314 
Debt service 8 995 . 9 878 11 656 . 13 754 
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables, op.cit. 
a/ External public and private debt guaranteed by the State, 
disbursed. 
b/ Projection based on 18 per cent annual growth of the debt 
and maintenance of the service-debt coefficient at the 
average level for 1970-1975. 
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IV. THE CHANGES IN THE ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE IMF 
AND THE JAMAICA MEETING AGREEMENTS 
The agreements, adopted at the meeting of the Interim Committee 
of the International Monetary Fund in Jamaica in January 1976 gave 
their final support to a series of new provisions which modified 
the constitution of the IMF. These changes affect five basic aspects 
of the monetary system: the function of gold, the currency exchange 
system, the Special Drawing Rights, the operations and transactions 
of the Fund and its institutional structure. 
1. Gold in the reformed monetary system 
The new provisions signified the abolition of the official 
price of gold and of the set. of rules designed to implement the 
official price, including the elimination of the limitations on the 
Central Banks or monetary authorities to operate freely in the gold 
market. Without an official price, gold ceases to be the centre of 
the monetary system since any pre-established'link between gold and 
currencies is removed. Gold will thus play the same role in the 
monetary system as any other non-perishable product, with the sole 
difference that it is very widely accepted. 
In general, the Fund is authorized to sell gold at a price 
linked to the market price, in exchange for a currency, with certain 
limitations and after consulting the country whose currency is to be 
acquired in exchange for gold. It is also authorized to sell gold 
to the countries which were members on 31 August 1975 in proportion 
to their quotas on that date, in exchange for their own currency 
and at the official price. 
Whenever the Fund sells gold at the market price it will pay 
into its General Account the amount corresponding to the official 
price and the surplus shall be paid into a special account both for 
ordinary operations and to finance special operations not considered 
in the agreement; these include, inter alia, direct distribution to 
the developing countries in proportion to their quotas. Such special 




With the elimination' of the official price of gold, the system 
of parities based on it disappears not only de facto but also de Tjure 
with the result that a new exchange system is needed» 
2. The exchange system 
The changes relating to the exchange system are aimed at 
allowing each country to use the system of its choice: floating 
rates, gradual and frequent adjustments, joint, floating with other 
currencies, a fixed exchange rate with respect to the intervention, 
currency .or the special iirawing rights or a group of currencies, or 
other,systems of the Central Banks' choice» It is specified that 
whatever the system applied», the Fund shall exercise general surveillance 
over the operation of the systems in use to ensure the collaboration 
of its members in solving the problems which may arise» . 
In other words, the new Articles of the Fund do not establish 
an exchange system but rather sanction the existing situation,1/ 
although'it also authorizes the Fund to re-establish a system of 
parities whose basis is only specified in general terms. The draft 
article states that the Fund may determine, by an 35 per cent majority 
of the total! voting, power", that international economic conditions 
permit the introduction of'a widespread system of exchange arrangements 
bafced on stable but adjustable par'values, which may be established 
in terms of special drawing rights' or of another common denominator 
which is neither gold nor a currency. It is also established that 
the maximum and the minimum rates for spot exchange transactions between 
the currency of one country and the currencies of other members that 
maintain par values shill not differ from parity by more than k per 
cent, a margin which the Fund may change by an 35 per cent majority 
1/ It is proposed to change the title of Article IV of the 
Articles of Agreement of the. Fund.. The title was "Par Values 
of Currencies" .and 'the proposal is to replace this by 
"Obligations Regarding Exchange Arrangements". 
/of the 
of the total voting power. If the par values are expressed in terms 
of a base other than currencies, the margin applies in the same way 
to all of them.l/ 
Ir order to re-establish the system of par values, in addition 
to the 85 per cent majority requirements, the Fund must reach a 
judgement on the world economic situation, with particular regard 
to sources of liquidity and the adjustment process. With regard to 
the former, it was hoped that there would be good control of the 
growth of national liquidity. 
As for the second, it was hoped that arrangements would exist 
to ensure that the countries in surplus and also those in deficit in 
their balances of payments would take prompt, effective and symmetrical 
action to achieve adjustment. In addition, the Fund shall base its 
judgement on the stability of the world economy taking into account 
price movements and growth rates in the economies of the member 
countries. 
3« The Special Drawing Rights 
The purpose of the changes relating to the characteristics and 
use of the special drawing rights is that they should become the 
main reserve asset of the International Monetary System. The link 
between the special drawing rights and gold is ended, and the'Fund 
is authorized to determine, by a 70 per cent majority of the total 
voting power, the method by which to value them; substantial changes 
in the valuation systems can only be made by a majority of 85 per cent. 
In general terms the provisions are maintained which limit the use of 
the special drawing rights to the existence of a "need" to use them 
and not merely a country's desire to change the composition of its 
reserves. The principle of "designation" is maintained by virtue of 
which the Fund may designate a country to provide currency in exchange 
1/ If the par values are expressed in terms of a currency, the 
possible margin of variation of that currency shall be half the 
margin of variation of the others. 
/for special 
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for special drawing rights so long as the position"of its reserves 
is strong enough. .. On the other hand, the majority of the'total 
voting power required to modify or eliminate the reconstitution 
obligation is reduced from 85 to"70 per cental/ 
The restrictions on;the rate of interest paid on special drawing 
rights are lifted and the use.of gold as a means of payment for 
obtaining special drawing rights for the purpose of paying such 
charges is eliminated. The countries participating in the special, 
drawing rights' account have undertaken to collaborate in converting 
the latter into the "principal asset of the International Monetary 
System. Moreover, i't x's established that the countries will be able 
to pay to the Fund currencies of other member countries instead of 
special drawing rights, provided that the issuing countries of the 
currencies in question agree to the operation. 
The operations of the Monetary Fund and its 
^nstituti onal structur e 
The new provisions also provide for the modernization of the 
operations and transactions of the Fund and an expansion of its 
categories, including greater, flexibility in,the use of the Fund's 
resources for financing international; buffer stocks of commodities; 
similarly it is expected that IMF will use its holdings of all the 
currencies in its operations, and not only those of a few countries, 
as is the case at present. In this connexion, the concept of a 
"de facto convertible currency" is replaced by the "freely usable 
currency". 
As regards the institutional structure of the agency the new . 
statutes authorize the Board of Governors of the Fund to establish, 
as a new organ of this Board, a Council of Governors to serve as a 
1/ According to the current rules the participants must maintain, 
at the end of each calendar-quarter, average daily holdings of 
special drawing rights over the most recent five-year period 
which; is not less than 30 per ;cent of the average of its daily 
cumulative allocation of special drawing rights over the same 
period. If the,average is below the minimum, there is an 
obligation to "reconstitute", i.e., to acquire special drawing 
rights to fulfil the obligation. 
/forum for 
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forum for analysis and discussions at a more active and efficient 
political level than that of the Board. The members of the Council 
will be the same.in number as the Executive Directors of the Fund, 
and these members will be elected by the countries themselves or by 
the groups of countries which elect executive directors. 
5. Other decisions of the Interim Committee 
In addition to the modifications to the Articles of Agreement 
of the IMF, the meeting of the Interim Committee in Jamaica ratified 
the decision to sell one-sixth of the Monetary Fund's holdings of 
gold (some 25 million ounces) by public auction over a. period of 
four years, and to set aside any profits accruing for the developing 
countries, both through the direct distribution to those countries 
of a portion of the profits on the basis of their quotas, and by 
setting up a special assistance fund for developing countries in 
difficult circumstances. In the latter case,.account will be taken 
of the per capita income level of the member Country in question.1/ 
The decision to restitute to each member country in exchange 
for its currency, the proportion corresponding to its quota of a 
total of 25 million addition ounces, valued at the official price 
of 0.888671 grammes of fine gold per special drawing right was 
ratified. 
At the meeting in Jamaica, the Interim Committee endorsed the 
agreements reached by the Directors of the Monetary Fund in respect 
of the increase in the quotas of the member countries in the Fund. 
This agreement consists in an overall increase in quotas of 32«,5 per 
cent.2/ This increase is shared in such a way that the proportion 
1/ This means that special preference would be given to countries 
with a per capita income lower than SDR 300 (US$360); thereby 
excluding most of Latin America. 
2/ The increase in quotas has been already approved at a vote taken 
by the Governors, but it will not come into effect until the 
legal requirements are met in each country, and until the reforms 
in the Constitutive Agreement of the Monetary Fund are approved. 
The whole process may take more than a year. 
/of the 
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of the oil-producing countries is doubled (increasing from 5 to 
10 per cent of, the total); the share of the other developing countries 
remains the same and that of the industrial countries is reduced. 
At the same time, the Committee decided to support the proposal to 
increase each one of the credit tranches of the Fund by k5 per cent, 
as a temporary measure Until the increase in quotas comes into effect. 
Moreover, iphe Committee welcomed the decision of the Directors 
of the Fund to modify the machinery of compensatory financing for 
temporary shortfalls in export income. These modifications liberalize 
the system, and allows account to be taken of events of the moment, 
including prices prevailing in international"trade. 
6. Effects on the developing countries 
The most important among these decisions, as regards their effect 
on the developing countries, are those related to the abolition of 
the official price of gold, the use of all currencies in operations 
and transactions, the acceptance of the existence of multiple exchange 
systems, the changes introduced in the compensatory financing facility, 
the temporary increase in the credit tranches of the Fund and the 
setting up of the Trust Fund. 
This range of measures has diverse effects for the developing 
countries, and for Latin American countries in particular. 
First, the abolition of the official price of gold - as long 
as its widespread acceptance continues - means in practice an increase 
in the price of gold. Although market prices already influence, the 
decisions of the Central Banks, the freedom to deal in gold at market 
prices legitimises its consideration at prices higher than the 
official 1 SDR per O.8188761 grammes of fine, gold, the equivalent of 
kZ dollars per ounce.- In fact, the Fund had already reached agreement 
with at least one member country that this country could raise the 
value of the gold of its reserves, for domestic purposes, to a price 
higher than the market price. 
/A higher 
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A higher.price for gold signifies an increase in liquidity 
expressed in terms of currency, in proportion to holdings in gold. 
But, because of uncertainty as to the market price, it is likely 
that the measurement of liquidity thus created will be based on a 
specific discount factor due to such uncertainty. 
Assuming that there is a difference in price of 30 dollars per 
ounce between the official price and the market price, the ligitimization 
of the latter for official operations, should the modification proposed 
to the Constitutive Agreement be approved, will affect the behaviour 
of official holders of gold. If in view of uncertainty as to market 
price the profit which determines the behaviour of official holders 
of gold is reduced to 50 dollars, the resulting increase in liquidity 
would be in the region of 50,000 million dollars. Of this total not 
more than 2,600 million dollars tiould correspond to the non-oil-exporting 
developing countries.1/ 
Furthermore, the provisions relating to the use of all the 
currencies in the Fund for its operations imply that the currencies 
of the developing countries, which in general are not considered 
reserve currencies will also be used, will, therefore, be converted 
into such currencies. This means that the reserves of the developing 
countries would be compromised, though to what extent it is difficult 
to specify. 
There are other probable iong-term effects, but perhaps more 
important ones, of the new agreements on the developing countries. 
The confirmation of floating as a system could give rise to the need 
for diversifying the holdings of currencies in the reserves of the 
countries, reducing instead of increasing the importance of the 
special drawing rights. For the developing countries, whose currencies 
will not, generally, be held as reserves by other countries, this trend 
could signify a cost in terms of resources given in exchange for the 
1/ Estimates on the basis of the holdings of gold by member countries 
of IMF of 1,000 million ounces, of which 5 per cent corresponds 
to holdings by the non-oil-exporting developing countries. 
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currencies of other Countries which are so held. This cost is also 
difficult to evaluate in advance, and measurement of it will have, 
to wait for" events to run their bourse.' 
For its part, floating in itself implies an additional cost 
for most of trie developing countries which, owing to the lack of 
exchange markets for their currency transactions, or the small scale 
of such markets, find it necessary to peg their currencies to one of 
a country or group of countries with which they trade. This fact 
implies tiiat the currency of the developing countries in question will 
float together with the principal currency. It can be expected that 
the movements of the latter will be in response to the adjustment 
needs of the issuing country, and may have a stabilizing effect for 
this country. But there could be, and there probably will be, 
destabilizing effects for the currency of the developing country, 
involving higher adjustment costs for this country. Of course, if 
floating succeeds in reducing fluctuations in the international trade 
of the developed countries, it will, because of this, have a positive 
effect on the developing countries; however, available evidence does 
not seem to point in that direction. 
The changes introduced in the compensatory financing facility 
make for easier uSe of this facility lay the developing countries, 1/ 
and IMF estimates appear to indicate that the developing countries will 
be able to obtain abbut 1,000 million dollars through this channel in 
1976.2/ If it is assumed that there will continue to be net increases of 
1,000 million dollars a year'until the figure of an additional 5»000 
million is reached, the Current value of this greater access to credit, at 
a rate of 7 per cent annually, would be less than 4,400 million dollars. 
1/ It is not yet possible to measure in concrete terms the 
implications of the easier use of the compensatory financing 
facility, since these will depend not only on the new operational 
rules, but also on the specific policies which the Fund may 
putinto practice. 
2/ Statement by the Managing Director of IMF at a press conference 
on 8 January 1976, IMF Bulletin, 26 January 1976, pp. 24 and 25. 
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The temporary rise of 45 per cent in the Fund's credit tranche 
also places increased resources at the disposal of all the member 
countries. Through this channel the developing countries could 
obtain about 500 million dollars in 1976.1/ If it is assumed that 
these countries will receive net increases of 500 million dollars 
annually until the sum of 2,000 million is reached, the current value 
of these resources, also at 2 per cent annually, would be around 
1,800 million dollars. 
Lastly, the Trust Fund could mean an additional contribution 
of 400 to 500 million dollars for the benefit of the poorest 
developing countries.!/ 
Therefore, the liberalization of the compensatory financing 
facility and the temporary increase in the credit tranches mean 
about 5,200 million dollars for the non-oil-exporting developing 
countries, measured in terms of current value. The valuation of 
gold at its free, market price and the Trust Fund, for their part, 
mean about 3,000 million dollars. 
At the same time, however, the termination of the oil facility 
means the loss of the right to draw resources amounting to about 
2,800 million dollars, which corresponds to the current value of the 
developing countries* drawings effected or approved in 1974, 1975 
and 1976. 
In addition, the developing countries are affected by the greater 
necessity of making adjustments in their economies vis^a-vis-the 
fluctuations of the principal currencies, and by the need to accumulate 
additional currencies in their reserves. For the developed'countries, 
in contrast, floating would appear to solve some problems of capital 
movements which are difficult to handle through other channels, while 
the accumulation of currencies by them is compensated for by each one 
accumulating the currencies of the rest. In net terms, the accumulation 
of currencies by the developing countries means that they absorb 
currencies issued by the developed countries. 
1/ See footnote 2/ on page 83. 
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Furthermore, the developed countries and oil-exporting countries 
:1 
will receive an increase in their liquidity, measured in currency 
terms, of some 48,000 million dollars, and will also have the possibility 
of using the expanded credit tranches of the Fund, which may mean a 
current value of some 5,600 million dollars more, thus bringing the 
total to around 53»600 million dollars. In addition, these countries 
will cease to contribute to the financing of the oil facility, which 
involved granting financing (net of drawings by developed countries) 
to a current value of some 2,800 million dollars, thus'bringing the 
total to around 56,400 million dollars. 
As will be seen from thé appended table, the quantifiable effects 
of the Jamaica agreements and of the other measures adopted by "the 
International Monetary Fund represent resources amounting to nearly 
64,000 million dollars, of which only 10 per cent are destined for 
the non-oil-ëxporting developing countries. It should be remembered 
that these countries represent 22 per cent of the quotas in the Fund 




MEASURABLE EFFECTS OF THE -REFORM OF THE MONETARY SYSTEM AND 
OTHER AGREEMENTS BY THE FUND ON THE DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES AND ON THE OTHER MEMBERS OF IMF 
(Thousands of millions of dollars) 
Non-oil-exporting 
developing countries Other members 
Compensatory financing 
Credit tranches 
4 387 a/ 







6 442 Total SLS.Z2 
a/ Calculated on the assumption that only non-oil-exporting 
developing countries make use of this service« The calculation 
also assumes that there will be a net increase in drawings of 
1,000 million dollars annually for five years, and that thenceforward 
there will be no new net increases« A discount rate of 7 per cent 
annually v/as used to determine the current value. 
b/ Calculated on the assumption that there will be a net increase 
in drawings by developing countries of 500 million dollars 
annually, up to a total of 2,000 million dollars. 
c/ Calculated on the assumption that there will be a net increase in 
the drawings of,the other member countries of 2 billion dollars 
per year, until the figure of 6 billion dollars is reached. 
d/ Calculated on the assumption of a gain of 50 dollars per ounce on 
the gold kept as reserves. 
e/ Conversion of the actual figures at a discount rate of 7 per cent 
annually. 
